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Through ethnographic research undertaken at a dementia day-care centre (DDC) in 
Singapore, I examine the ways through which care workers “care” for older persons 
with dementia (OPWDs) whose behaviours they regard as problematic, and cognitive 
abilities as “precarious, questionable and in decline. Care practices are situated in the 
context of a state-promulgated “many helping hands” (MHH) governance framework, 
and the recent adoption of person-centred care (PCC) by healthcare and social 
services in Singapore. Following Foucault’s conceptualisation of “biopower”, I 
theorise care practices as “technologies of the self for the other” that involve one’s 
reflexive efforts to “know oneself” in the process and for the purpose of caring for 
“the other”, and whose effects are mediated by biopolitical processes—i.e. the MHH 
approach in this study. First, I discuss care workers’ laborious efforts to govern their 
bodily actions when caring for OPWDs. Next, considering “care” in the particular 
case of dementia, I explicate how care work is shaped by contrasting discourses of 
“precarious minds” that emphasise vulnerability and dependency, against PCC that 
values autonomy and agency. Finally, noting the DDC’s structural position between 
state agencies and OPWDs’ families in the MHH framework, I illustrate how 
“technologies of the self for the other” are developed and constrained by demands and 
interests of families and the state. I argue that while DDCs and care workers are 
thinking and acting subjects in the schema of a “politics of life”, OPWDs, defined 
through cognitive decline and vulnerability, are reduced to passive care recipients and 
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Chapter 1. Introduction 
The most vivid images of my days as a researcher-volunteer at Dandelion Dementia 
Day-care pertain to my observations of interactions between care workers and older 
persons with dementia (OPWDs)1 who Dandelion terms “clients”. Between December 
2014 and February 2016, I observed dementia care work practices for clients, which 
incited me to think about the possibilities, challenges and limits of caring in difficult 
situations. Care workers watch over clients, check for signs of illness or discomfort; 
keep their ears open to indications of distraught; rush to clients in risky situations (e.g. 
fall-risk clients who abruptly stand from their seats), and slow down when assisting 
clients who use walking aids. They engage clients in activities, often through jokes 
and banter; provide puzzles and crafts according to their knowledge of clients’ 
cognitive ability and preferences; laugh and joke alongside clients, and sometimes at 
clients’ faux pas; and tell fabricated stories that are aligned with clients’ realities to 
soothe their worries and anxieties. I observed care workers frowning and scowling 
while bringing a client who had dirtied himself to the toilet, and heaving a sigh as 
they knead their shoulders at a day’s close. These observations of dementia care work 
form the crux of this thesis, which I analyse against the backdrop of the state-
promulgated “many helping hands” (MHH) governance framework, and the recent 
adoption of person-centred care (PCC) by healthcare and social services in Singapore. 
Dementia is increasingly prevalent in developed countries such as Singapore, 
as biomedical, nutritional and lifestyle advancements slow down the progression of 
diseases, increase longevity, and result in population ageing (Manderson and Smith-
Morris 2010). There is mounting pressure on governments to provide for the aged and 
aged sick, which foresaw the establishment of hospital geriatric departments, nursing 
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homes, day-care centres and respite services (Burns 2005; Lee and Satku 2016). The 
panoply of images above is situated within one of Singapore’s dementia day-care 
centres (DDCs), and attests to the laboriousness and ethical and political complexities 
of dementia care work. Caring for persons whose cognitive abilities are declining, and 
who may have difficulties in caring for themselves, can be physically and emotionally 
intense (Innes 2009; Lopez 2006a). Dementia care workers develop strategies such as 
those depicted above when coping with “behavioural and psychological symptoms of 
dementia” (BPSDs2) or “behavioural disorders” when “caring” becomes too difficult 
(Lee-Treweek 1994). Care provision, especially when the cognition and subjectivity 
of care recipient are doubted, entangles with an impetus to manage BPSDs or govern 
their behaviour (Kontos and Martin 2013). Recognition of PWDs’ vulnerability, viz. 
difficulties in caring for themselves, overlaps with “care” that elides to management 
(cf. Ungerson 2005). Therefore, as Shield (1995:124) suggests, institutional dementia 
care settings are an “intriguing landscape in which ethical dilemmas find fertile soil”, 
and boundaries between definitions of “oppressive” and “good” care become blurred 
(cf. Brunelli 2005; Hutchison 2015). 
 This complexity is amplified by the PCC movement that developed alongside 
healthcare services advancements, which calls attention to PWDs’ choices, and social 
relationships, and “recognition, respect and trust” for them (Kitwood 1997; Sabat and 
Harre 1992; Sabat and Collins 1999). It challenges biomedical perspectives that 
underscore PWDs’ “decline, decay and deficiency” (Innes 2009:13), and attempts to 
shift from an understanding of care that is rooted in client’s vulnerability to one that 
emphasizes their personhood, autonomy and empowerment. PCC became popular in 
Britain and the United States through the 1990s (Innes 2009), and gained traction in 
Singapore in the 2000s, as evinced through the development of PCC guidelines by 
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state healthcare agencies and training sessions by the Agency for Integrated Care 
(AIC), the and other agencies for care workers (Institute of Mental Health n.d.; Social 
Services Institute n.d.). Dandelion adopted PCC in early 2014, about a year before my 
fieldwork began. There were organised attempts to observe clients’ behaviours, 
understand otherwise incomprehensible actions as remnants of their past, and conduct 
activities for them through knowledge of their pre-dementia biographies. Yet, there 
are instances where PCC is problematic, for instance, when participation in PCC 
activities (e.g. cooking sessions and outings) predicate upon care workers’ assessment 
of clients’ cognitive abilities, their safety, and care workers’ abilities to manage 
clients’ difficult behaviour. Care workers also employed fabricated stories to manage 
clients’ behaviour (e.g. make “fall-risk” clients stay seated), or comfort clients who 
repeatedly complain about stolen belongings or request to go home to care for their 
family. In these instances, as I will elaborate, moral/ethical action and power relations 
overlap, and the possibilities of empowering PWDs, upholding their personhood, and 
effecting “good” dementia care as defined by PCC become seemingly curtailed.  
 This thesis takes “care” and “dementia care work” as its central concerns: care 
work as embodied labour that bespeaks both moral/ethical and power relations; care 
work provided for individuals whose subjectivities are regarded as frail, questionable 
and in decline; and care work as situated in Singapore’s healthcare and social services 
system3. Through 15 months of ethnographic research at a DDC, I examine the ways 
through which care workers provide “care” for OPWDs whose behaviours they regard 
as problematic, and cognition as “precarious”, questionable and in decline. I observed 
during fieldwork that PCC influenced care workers to develop sensitivity towards the 
issue of “care”, as they strive to provide good and proper care as spelt out by PCC. 
Yet, their watchfulness and attempts at managing BPSDs are sometimes incongruous 
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with the PCC approach. Management techniques evince both a concern for clients’ 
safety and power relations between care workers and clients. I take these incongruities 
as the starting point of my inquiry. As moral/ethical practices that are entangled with 
power relations, and situated within Singapore’s healthcare system as a governmental 
regime, I argue that dementia care work can be analysed with reference to Foucault’s 
(1980, 1985, 1986, 1988) theorising of “biopower”.  
The remainder of this chapter discusses the historical and conceptual grounds 
of this thesis. First, I discuss “dementia” from biomedical and everyday perspectives, 
and the implications of dementia on social relations and healthcare governance. Then, 
I discuss Foucault’s (1980, 1985, 1986, 1988) theorising of “biopower”, “biopolitics” 
and “technologies of the self”, and establish their relevance through examining the 
historical trajectory of healthcare and social services provision for the aged sick and 
OPWDs in Singapore. Finally, I present my research problem, conceptual framework, 
and an overview of this thesis. 
On Dementia: Behaviour, Social Relations, and State Governance 
Dementia, in biomedical terms, is a general diagnostic category for neurodegenerative 
disorders that have symptoms of cognitive decline and memory loss (Kua et al. 2014; 
McKhann et al. 1984; Schenberg et al. 1987)4. Frequently conflated with Alzheimer’s 
disease, which represents about 50% of dementia cases (Hansberry, Chen and 
Gorbien 2005)5, dementia also includes diseases with similar symptoms but different 
aetiologies, such as vascular dementia that results from “mini-strokes” and fronto-
temporal dementia where OPWDs lose their motor skills and ability to string words 
together. These different types of dementias are observed to lead to an attenuation of 
taken-for-granted ways of communication and interaction, which depend in part on 
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memory and lucidity (McLean 2007). At Dandelion, for instance, some clients are 
occasionally reminded of activities that they are engaging in, and clients with severer 
cognitive difficulties are guided on how to perform daily activities, from going to the 
toilet and using walking aids to taking steps forward and sitting down. Some clients 
repeatedly call for family members, complain that their belongings are stolen, or 
become anxious or frustrated for various reasons, and are offered fabricated stories 
that are aligned with their versions of reality.  
Biomedical knowledge shapes lay understandings of dementia, which inform 
everyday care practices and interactions with PWDs. Yet, it cannot be assumed that 
lay knowledge is reducible to or commensurable with biomedical perspectives (Sinha 
1995). Biomedicine’s influence on perceptions of and social relations with PWDs is 
observed in India, for instance, where there is a shift from lay notions of sathiyana 
(“sixtyish”) (Cohen 1998) and chinnan (“childishness”; derogatory) (Iype, Ajitha and 
Shaji 2006) to dementia as neurodegenerative disease (Brijnath and Manderson 2011). 
Reframing dementia into a biomedical problem that demands cure also corresponds to 
the mobilising and/or strain on economic resources and family ties. Yet, vernacular 
understandings persist to some degree even as biomedicine encroaches upon everyday 
life; biomedical knowledge is neither all encompassing, nor its influence homogenous 
(cf. Basting 2009; Thorton 2006).  
However, these perspectives, biomedical or otherwise, converge on an 
understanding that PWDs behave differently from their pre-dementia selves. 
“Dementia”, in all forms, manifests through altered behaviour, mood changes, and 
declining cognitive and physiological abilities, which can disrupt daily activities and 
threaten PWDs’ relationships with their families and communities (Schillmeier 2014). 
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Responses invoked differ between societies, and dementia may not even be a 
culturally relevant notion in some, but there is nonetheless response towards people 
who exhibit difficulties in remembering, cognition and performing daily tasks (Radley 
1993; Van Gorp and Vercruysse 2012). Families and kin often struggle to manage, 
which can provide the impetus for additional care (Brijnath and Manderson 2011), or 
culminate in malice and neglect (Cohen 1998). An attention to embodied behaviour, 
relations and response is thus important for inquiry on dementia and dementia care.  
Governments of developed nations see dementia as a complex neuropathology 
that has no cure, and which not only destabilises family and community relationships 
but places immense pressure on the national economy (Schillmeier 2014). Developed 
countries, many of which are characterised by high living standards and established 
biomedical services, are increasingly concerned with managing dementia and illnesses 
that result from higher life expectancies (Lee and Satku 2016). This gave rise to 
myriad dementia care efforts that range from comprehensive healthcare policies and 
dementia/geriatric services, to government-sponsored research on dementia (Burns 
2005). These efforts take place against the backdrop of discourses that mark dementia 
as a hallmark of population aging that plague developed societies (Schillmeier 2014).  
Healthcare arrangements in these countries vary despite a common recognition 
of dementia and age-related chronic illnesses as a social issue. Zisselman and Rovner 
(1994) writes that PWDs and families in United States have many medical and social 
services to choose from, but which are loosely integrated, driven by capitalist interests 
and inadequately funded by the state. This capital-driven model contrasts with a state-
directed approach in Britain that seeks to reverse reliance of hospice care for OPWDs 
by encouraging family and community care and promoting primary healthcare 
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(Godber and Wilkinson 1994). Reliance on familial care is also espoused in Japan, 
although the state also organises a nursing home for the aged sick without familial 
support and too poor to afford private nursing facilities (Hasegawa and Imai 1994). 
Hence, healthcare and social services in developed nations operate within dissimilar 
state-institutional-societal configurations. Nation-states galvanise various institutions 
and actors—individuals, families, community, medical and social services—in 
different ways to address what they recognise as a societal issue.  
This thesis attends to the Singapore context, characterised by a state-initiated 
MHH approach defined through partnership between state agencies, VWOs, the 
community and families in caring for OPWDs and the aged sick. Families are 
accorded the responsibilities of primary caregivers, in social and economic terms, 
although state-regulated and partially state-funded commercial alternatives—DDCs, 
e.g. Dandelion, and other eldercare services—are also available. This arrangement, as 
I will show through the example of Dandelion, allows the state to assume lesser 
responsibilities in directly caring for OPWDs and the aged sick, but still, through 
policies, regulations and financial (dis)incentives, ensure that they are cared for. 
  
Foucault, “Biopolitics”, and Medicine and Healthcare 
In many ways, the social space that extends from these healthcare systems for 
managing age-related issues to social interactions between care workers and OPWDs, 
framed through quotidian intermixed with biomedical discourses of dementia, can be 
analysed through Foucault’s (1980, 1985, 1986, 1988) theorising on “biopower” as a 
modern mode of governance6. Biopower operates in and through varied mechanisms, 
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from regulations and policies to bodies and spaces, applied to a wide range of objects, 
and is aimed at governing a populace's “life forces” (Foucault 1980). His approach in 
theorising a “politics of life” (Fassin 2009; Rose 2001) attends to “the integral link 
between micro- and macro-political levels” of power (Lemke 2001:203). Foucault 
(1980, 1988) describes two related modes of governance: “biopolitics”, by which a 
population is conceived as a governmental problem and managed through knowledge 
and practices that act on populations; and “anatomo-politics” as practices that act 
upon corporeal individuals for disciplining and normalising them towards biopolitical 
ideals. Hence, biopower “invests life through and through” by having “discipline of 
the body” and “regulation of the population” as “two poles around which organisation 
of power over life was deployed” (Foucault 2003:81). Healthcare systems—e.g. 
public health projects (Armstrong 1983), health promotion efforts (Bunton, Nettleton 
and Burrows 1995), and weight management and other forms of body management 
(Crawford 1994)—are examples of biopower (Petersen 1997, 2012). Scholars also 
examined how biopolitical regimes define “contours of ableness” that lead to the 
stigmatisation of disability (Campbell 2009) or attempts to medicalise/normalise them 
by encouraging self-care (Yates 2005)7. This thesis contributes to these researches on 
healthcare by examining care/management of PWDs through the lens of biopower, 
from micropolitical through macropolitical levels.   
As state and other institutional discourses (power-knowledge) permeate through 
populations, individuals become conduits of biopower regimes when they internalise 
and conduct/discipline themselves according to discourses. This enables a subtle yet 
effective mode of governance that works through subjectivities of individuals within a 
population, when they become self-governing biopolitical subjects/agents who engage 
in “technologies of the self” (Foucault 1985, 1986). While individuals’ subjectivities 
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are constituted in and through discourses, discourses do not fully determine decisions 
and actions. Individuals, as agents, make sense of their circumstances through use of 
different discourses, which in turn act upon and (re)shape biopolitical regimes. 
Petryna (2002), for instance, points to activism by victims of the Chernobyl disaster, 
and demonstrates how they actively engage diverse discourses, including biomedical 
knowledge, in making claims and seeking redress (also Rabinow 2005). Rose and 
Novas (2005) also show that consumers of medical services possess agency in using 
online information to manage their illnesses. Hence, individuals are not only subjects 
of biopolitical regimes but they also exercise agency in understanding and negotiating 
extant discourses vis-à-vis their life conditions. Yet, in considering healthcare systems 
as biopolitical regimes, theorising dementia care faces an additional issue: how are 
PWDs who are regarded as not in command of their will and behaviour, and are thus 
not governable, situated within a biopolitical regime? How do care workers as 
governable individuals differ from PWDs as non-governable individuals, and what is 
the significance of this for the ethics and politics of “care” provision? In addressing 
this issue, my thesis discusses not only the workings of biopower but also the “limits” 
or contours of biopower that separates the governable from non-governable.  
Singapore, as with other developed nations, recognises dementia and other age-
related illnesses as an issue that needs to be addressed, especially with regards to care 
provision. Residents aged 65 and above constitute 11.8% of its population in 2015 
(Department of Statistics 2016), and the risk of developing dementia doubles every 
five years from 65 years of age (Alzheimer's Disease International 2012). As put forth 
by IMH researchers, “A greater burden of care for elderly patients with dementia is 
therefore imminent, urging healthcare professionals and policy-makers to search for 
cost-effective and accessible healthcare options that will meet the care needs of 
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people with dementia and enhance their quality of life” (Vaingankar et al. 2013:1605). 
These are evocative of biopolitical processes that Foucault (1980) discusses, that are 
oriented towards ideals of cost-effectiveness, quality care (“care needs” and “quality 
of life”), and sociality (“deinstitutionalization” and “community living”, which they 
later propose). This thesis takes (1) the “many helping hands” (MHH) approach, (2) 
development of geriatric services, and (3) the recent adoption of PCC as biopolitical 
processes in which dementia care work is situated. I now briefly examine these three 
inter-related historical processes. 
 
Historical Background: Healthcare Provision for the Sick Aged in Singapore  
Healthcare and Social Services in Singapore, 1900s to 1970s 
At this juncture, I broadly examine healthcare services for a range of other diseases as 
dementia and other age-related illnesses only became pertinent in the 1980s and 1990s 
(Mehta 2002; Teo et al. 2006). I trace the shape of the present healthcare system for 
care/management of dementia and other age-related illnesses to healthcare provision 
in the early 1900s that is later adapted for the present situation. Healthcare and social 
services provision was segregated along racial, ethnic and social class lines in colonial 
Singapore (1900s to 1950s). Hospitals that provided biomedical care mostly attended 
to the British and educated elites, many of whom were employed in colonial service8. 
Authorities took an interest in institutionalising the mentally ill9, especially “native 
lunatics”, but this was more of an effort at social control than medical care (Lee 1973; 
Ng 2001). Locals and migrant settlers, who were working class and formed the bulk 
of the populace, largely relied on social and medical services provided by 
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racial/ethnic and religious groups (Teo et al. 2006). Hospitals and medicinal halls 
organised by philanthropists for their community were a major source of care and 
social support for the poor, sick and handicapped10. Hence, a community-led initiative 
along racial/ethnic lines emerged at the interstices of a colonial governmental project 
that excluded most of the local and migrant populace11.  
In the 1920s and 1930s, the colonial state began to direct its attention towards 
management of spaces and populations, through public health and sanitation efforts to 
combat malnutrition and infectious diseases such as malaria, tuberculosis, enteric 
fever, and cholera. The 1930s saw the enactment of a national health scheme and 
public works on maintenance of water supply and sewage disposal. Whereas native 
and migrants were neglected prior to 1930, they were now included as citizens within 
a public health biopolitical regime (cf. Armstrong 1983). The Second World War 
halted these efforts but post-war rebuilding, initiated by the colonial government but 
which greatly relied on local communities, saw the return of these projects at a greater 
scale (Lee and Satku 2016; Thomas et al. 2016). Primary healthcare services (e.g. 
outpatient clinics) were started and hospitals, many of which had facilities and 
equipment damaged during war, were renovated, expanded and modernised (Lee and 
Satku 2016). The state started organising social welfare, and more nurses and doctors 
were trained under stricter ordinances (Thomas et al. 2016). Yet, age-related illnesses, 
such as dementia, were still sidelined due to the small aged population; issues of the 
aged were subsumed under those of the poor, sick and handicapped (Teo et al. 2006).  
The Singapore government continued colonial administrators’ projects after 
self-government in 1959 and independence in 196512. Public health issues associated 
with population growth, overcrowding, and sanitation, and care for children—due to 
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the post-war baby boom—took centre-stage until 1970 (Lee and Satku 2016). Despite 
biomedical advances in 1950s and 1960s13, figures in 1965 reveal that infant mortality 
rates were high at 26/1000 live births, infectious diseases were common, and life 
expectancy was low at 64 years old (Seow and Lee 1994). The government’s focus 
remained on expanding primary healthcare services, viz. preventive medicine against 
infectious diseases, school health services, and antenatal services to reduce child and 
maternal mortality in urban and rural areas (Thomas et al. 2016).  
The expansion of healthcare and medical facilities in the 1960s was matched 
with fiscal policies regarding healthcare expenditure. These policies were emplaced to 
ensure a judicious use of public resources that allows for affordable healthcare but 
guards against wastage. Co-payment for medical services was implemented in 1960, 
although the state “continued to absorb the major portion of the cost, the development 
of manpower, and new infrastructure” (Lee and Satku 2016:8). Fee systems were 
introduced from 1960 to 1969, first at outpatient clinics and later in hospitals. Co-
payment was justified though “rapidly rising costs of sickness and demands of more 
urgent priorities” as treatment and technologies required for acute illnesses were more 
expensive than preventive medicine (Ministry of Health Report 1969, quoted in Lee 
and Satku 2016:10). Co-payment continues to the present, when its economic benefits 
are more evident in healthcare provision for dementia and other diseases that require 
long-term care. The biopolitics of healthcare—coordination of groups and individuals 
for medical/care provision (i.e. “who should care?”)—is accompanied by a biopolitics 
of healthcare financing—for an economic reason (i.e. “who should pay?”). 
As infectious diseases became better managed by the 1970s, focus shifted to 
curative treatment of acute diseases. Tan Tock Seng Hospital, for example, had many 
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tuberculosis wards that were gradually converted for acute medical care. Citizens 
adopted, internalised and abided by practices spelt out by the healthcare authorities 
earlier and health outcomes improved (e.g. longer lifespans, less childhood mortality). 
Earlier biopolitical processes, coupled with better quality of life that followed from 
economic progress in the 1970s, led to increasing life expectancy and greater number 
of older persons. Yet, from independence through 1970s, there remained little social 
services for the aged, and most policies for the aged were simply offshoots of existing 
welfare schemes (Cheung and Vasoo 1992). There were also few aged nursing homes, 
often started by religious groups, and state involvement in these projects, directly or 
indirectly (e.g. through funds and subsidies), was scarce (Parliament of Singapore 
1979). State policies and biomedical developments have yet to keep pace with the 
changing demographics of an aging population. Earlier public health projects laid the 
foundation for better health and increased longevity, which led to changing disease 
patterns—rise in acute, followed by age-related chronic illnesses (e.g. dementia) (Lee 
and Satku 2016)—that have different demands (e.g. long-term care that may place a 
strain on carers and economic resources) and entail different governmental strategies.  
Population Ageing: “Many Helping Hands” Approach and Geriatric Services 
It was only in the late 1970s when life expectancy increased, that the Singapore state 
saw population ageing as an imminent demographic and socioeconomic problem. The 
success of earlier biopolitical efforts produced a new governmental problem, and new 
strategies have to be developed for the care of the aged and aged sick. The Committee 
on the Problems of the Aged (1982 to 1984) was started, and similar ministerial and 
inter-ministerial bodies were formed in the next decade. Policies were devised and 
implemented, targeted at improving the financial, mental and physiological wellbeing 
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of elderlies in ways that do not compromise fiscal health (Lai 2016; Teo et al. 2006)14. 
These include the MHH approach that espouses a hierarchy of responsibility of caring 
for the aged and aged sick: individuals and their families are primarily responsible, 
followed by VWOs and the community, and financial support from the state is only 
considered when all else fails (Teo, Chan and Straughan 2003; Teo 2004). The onus 
to care for the aged and aged sick, financially and otherwise, is thus distributed (albeit 
unequally) among these various institutions.  
 Parliament statements in the early 1980s showed consensus among statesmen 
that older persons should be mainly cared for by their families (see Parliament of 
Singapore 1984). These were buttressed through “filial piety”, which is both assumed 
and expected of Singapore families. Akin to its approach of instituting co-payment in 
the 1960s, the aged sick and their families are responsible for medical costs, although 
services are often state-subsidised. VWOs are akin to paid hands that play supportive 
role vis-à-vis families-as-primary caregivers15. The state also referred to the history of 
religious, community and non state-run social services for the poor, aged and 
destitute, and argued that charitable acts are best provided by the community and 
voluntary organisations rather than the state. Yet, while voluntary organisations of 
days past provide care and support for those neglected by the colonial government, 
VWOs today are service providers that form part of the state-planned healthcare 
framework. Although many VWOs are still affiliated with philanthropic and religious 
groups, charity (and “care”) is now entwined with corporate interests (“economics”). 
As targets of state discourse of “filial piety” and “charity” and agents who care for the 
aged sick, families and VWOs become sites through which biopower operate. 
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 The 1990s saw a shift in biomedical and healthcare services’ attention towards 
geriatric medicine and treatment of age-related chronic illnesses, including dementia. 
Government panels such as the National Advisory Council for the Aged (1989-1997) 
and Inter-Ministerial Committee on Healthcare for the Elderly (1997-1999) helmed 
initiatives to develop long-term care facilities (including day-care centres and DDCs) 
and geriatric departments at hospitals (Mehta 2002). Chronic illnesses—dementia is 
an oft-quoted example16—often demand less urgent medical attention than acute 
diseases, but prolonged treatment translates to high costs for both patients and the 
state. The state promoted “step-down care” (e.g. day-care centres) in the 2000s, such 
that patients with less urgent chronic illnesses can be treated outside hospitals, and 
“integrated long term care” (ILTC) in order to facilitate transition from hospitals to 
step-down care facilities (Teo et al. 2006). The AIC was formed in 2009 as a platform 
for coordinating VWOs and organisations for these purposes17.  
PWDs are rarely hospitalised and only those with severe BPSD are admitted to 
IMH’s dementia wards. Upon diagnosis, care is usually provided by families and/or 
outsourced to day-care centres, nursing homes or other step-down care facilities. Day-
care centres embody the MHH ethos as elderlies stay with their families but remain 
cared for when family members are at work; care responsibilities are shared between 
families and the community. As VWO and step-down care facilities, day-care centres 
are also part of a cost-effective approach that benefits the state economically. Thus, 
Dandelion is located at the juncture of a biopolitics of care provision for the aged sick, 
and a biopolitics of healthcare financing.  
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The Person-Centred Care Movement in Dementia Care 
As healthcare services for OPWDs and other aged sick—from nursing homes to day-
care and hospice care services—became prevalent in developed countries in the 1980s 
and 1990s, social psychologists and gerontologists pushed for a recognition of PWDs’ 
“personhood”—recognition, respect and trust for them, and regard for them as “social 
beings” with choices, preferences and autonomy (Kitwood 1997)—against “decline, 
decay and deficiency models of dementia commonly espoused by those working 
within a broadly biomedical approach” (Innes 2009:13). This “person-centred care” 
(PCC) movement became popular in Britain and the United States in the 1990s (Innes 
2009), and Singapore in the late 2000s18. Most recently, in Singapore, Koh and Yap 
(The Straits Times, 5 January 2016) argued for “making the person the focus of care 
delivery”, and the importance of “fostering relationships with residents, emphasising 
individual needs and personal preferences, and empowering them in decision-making 
to create a sense of belonging”. Elsewhere, PCC is similarly described as “focus[ing] 
on the individual and tak[ing] into account the person's qualities, abilities [and] 
interests” and practised through “activities…tailored to [his/her] level of competence, 
life history, likes and dislikes” (The Straits times, 12 April 2016)19.  
PCC is promulgated by state healthcare agencies to VWO service providers 
through various guidelines (e.g. “Person-Centred Approach Toolkit” (Social Services 
Institute, n.d.)), courses (e.g. Aged Psychiatry Community Assessment and Treatment 
Services (APCATS) courses (Institute of Mental Health, n.d.)), and audits during 
which VWOs are assessed on their compliance to PCC and other state-espoused 
standards. Dandelion adopted PCC in early 2014, and there were organised efforts to 
acquire biographical information on clients and understand clients and their behaviour 
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in light of their pre-dementia selves. Activities were also conducted according to care 
workers’ knowledge of clients’ interests and care workers sought to recognise clients’ 
independence and autonomy as far as possible. Many activities such as clients’ trips 
and outings are also partially funded by the state, although much funds are obtained 
through donation and corporate sponsors. Insofar as these entail governance of VWOs 
towards a new vision of “good care”, state efforts at advancing PCC and Dandelion’s 
PCC practices can be understood with reference to the biopolitics of healthcare.  
Courses I attended at IMH and fieldwork at Dandelion also led me to observe 
that biomedical and institutional perspectives are still prevalent in dementia care even 
when PCC is encouraged. Contestations exist, as I describe in later chapters, between 
practices that recognize clients’ vulnerabilities and those that advance independence 
and autonomy20, and between families’ demands for institutional care (e.g. scheduled 
programmes) and the state’s attempts to promote PCC. Dandelion’s structural location 
between families and the state in the MHH framework thus shapes the kind of care 
that it provides. PCC’s interaction with biomedical and institutional care perspectives, 
as I show in Chapters 4 and 5, has implications on everyday understandings of PWDs’ 
“personhood”, OPWDs/clients’ relation to care workers, and their positioning within 
the governmental framework that shapes the “care” that they receive.   
 
Conceptual Framework and Scope of Discussion 
This thesis seeks to understand dementia care work practices through a refinement of 
Foucault’s theorising of “biopower”, which attends to analysis from the micropolitical 
(“technologies of the self” (Foucault 1985, 1986)) to the macropolitical (“biopolitics” 
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(Foucault 1980)) levels21. “Technologies of the self” (Foucault 1985, 1986), refers to 
practices by which individuals actively fashion their identities and actions within 
broader biopolitical processes-as-context. This concept is variously interpreted as 
“practices of the self” (Petersen 2012:9) or “techniques of life, of how to live” 
(Ramos 2010:23). Foucault discusses technologies of the self as “the manner in which 
[an individual] forms oneself as an ethical subject acting in reference to prescriptive 
elements [norms]” (1985:26), which proceeds through “effecting by their own means 
or with the help of others a certain number of operations on their own bodies, souls, 
thoughts, conduct and way of being” (1985:18). This is evidenced in dementia care 
work when care workers heighten their senses when watching over clients, hasten 
their pace when rushing to OPWDs, slow down and bend over to assist them, and 
manage their emotions when performing care. Care workers’ embodied practices and 
identities are shaped and reshaped through interactions with and knowledge of clients, 
and in relation to various ideals of good and proper care.  
While Foucault’s (1985, 1986) emphasis is on self-care (or self-governance), 
care work involves caring for an “other” in addition to reflexive engagement with 
one’s actions and emotions. Thus, I argue that “care”, in the case of care work, can be 
understood as “technologies of the self for the other”, which not only comprises one’s 
reflexive effort to “know oneself” but also a cultivation of one’s knowledge of “the 
other”. In fact, knowledge and care/management of the cared recipient occupies the 
forefront of care workers’ consciousness, rather than awareness of the care-giving self 
per se. Care workers’ efforts to cultivate their bodies for care/management of clients 
problematizes research that view care workers as empowered vis-à-vis care recipients 
(Gubrium 1997; Kontos and Martin 2013).  
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Next, in considering “care” viz. “technologies of the self for the other” for the 
particular instance of PWDs, I argue that discourses of dementia continue to define 
social roles of caregivers against cared-for in the micro-politics of care work relations. 
PWDs are treated as “precarious minds” whose subjectivities are considered as intact 
but frail and declining, thus vulnerable and in need of care. Apart from biomedical 
discourses, notions of “precarious minds” are also reinforced through care workers’ 
experiences of managing BPSDs. While the PCC perspective that has recently been 
adopted by Dandelion challenges the notion of “precarious minds”, it is fraught with 
difficulties partly because care continues to be developed upon and perpetuates ideas 
of PWDs’ vulnerability. I also identify certain areas of contradiction within PCC that 
impede its success, notably the incertitude of whether to relate to PWDs in terms of 
dementia (hence, as sick persons) or pre-dementia (implies inferiority of their current 
state) personhood. I argue that in the schema of a “politics of life” (Fassin 2009, Rose 
2001), in which life (subjectivity and agency) is determining basis and object/subject 
of biopower, PWDs, as persons defined through cognitive decline and vulnerability, 
are relegated to passive care recipients and targets rather than actors of biopower. 
Thirdly, referencing Foucault’s (1980, 1985, 1986) theorising on biopower, I 
explicate “technologies of the self for the others” and “precarious life” vis-à-vis their 
relation to “biopolitics” and “anatomopolitics” viz. the MHH approach. Dandelion, as 
a VWO social service provider, occupies a middle position between families and the 
state, and moral/ethical and power relations that characterise dementia care practices 
must be analysed in relation to its structural position; I consider biopolitical and 
economic logics in shaping possibilities and limits of care. I demonstrate that despite 
VWOs’ ostensible autonomy from the state, dearth of funds and resources compels 
them to rely on state funding. Funding applications and audits reinforce biopolitical 
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efficacy by giving the state prerogative in steering activities, programs, and care 
arrangements towards its aims even as it distances itself from direct care provision. 
Some OPWDs’ families also expect Dandelion, which is seen as a service provider, to 
conduct activities, monitor clients and provide assistance assiduously (e.g. maintain a 
toileting schedule), which approximate institutional care. Dandelion, due to customer-
service provider relations, tends to accede to families’ requests, including those that 
contravene PCC. Dementia care work thus entails moral/ethical and power relations 
situated within the MHH framework that are often oriented towards and reproduces 
the idea of “precarious minds”. Exclusion of PWDs, as “precarious minds”, from a 
“politics of life” (Fassin 2009; Rose 2001) can thus be traced to an interplay of both 
embodied “technologies of the self for the other” and the MHH biopolitical regime.  
Following this chapter, I present the methodological considerations in Chapter 
2, with a focus on embodied methodology and ways with which I sought to 
understand moral/ethical and political aspects of dementia care. Chapter 3 discusses 
“care” as “technologies of the self for the other” by care workers for clients. Chapter 4 
deliberates on the particularity of this concept when applied to the care of PWDs, 
who, I argue, are perceived as “precarious minds” whose subjectivities are considered 
as intact but frail and in decline. I also discuss the complex interplay of the PCC 
movement (which champions a “personhood” that values PWDs’ autonomy) and care 
practices and relations (that recognise PWDs’ vulnerabilities) in shaping care work at 
Dandelion, and their implications on PWD-care worker relations. Chapter 5 extends 
the inquiry through examining care practices vis-à-vis “biopolitics” (Foucault 1980), 
with references to the state-promulgated MHH approach. I conclude in Chapter 6 by 
revisiting the main themes of the thesis and presenting areas for further inquiry.  
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Chapter 2. Fieldwork and Methodology 
Dandelion is located at an apartment block in an elderly-populated public/government 
housing estate at the periphery of Singapore’s financial centre. Busy thoroughfares 
that connect the city centre to its outskirts flank both sides of the estate, adjoined by 
narrow streets lined with shop-houses. Elderly men gather at a pavilion, playing chess 
and conversing in Chinese dialects. Nearby some shop owners tend to medicinal halls, 
pastry shops and dried goods retail outlets. Buildings in this estate seem to have been 
given a fresh coat of blue paint months before my fieldwork. Yet, upon entering an 
apartment block, one notices the stripped paint, bad ventilation and dim lighting of the 
interior. Clothing boutiques, tailoring businesses, convenience stores and antique 
shops occupy the ground floor. One can vaguely discern verbal exchanges at the wet 
market at the basement, and the clatter of woks and pans from the food centre above. 
To get to Dandelion, I had to weave through market dealers wheeling in fresh produce 
and ladies pushing grocery carts, towards a lift lobby that serves the entire block of 
two-room apartments. Four small elevators that crank as they escalate and jerk when 
they stop bring me to the third floor. The lift opens to a void deck, where the silence 
and absence of human traffic contrast with the activities below. A black metal gate 
that marks Dandelion’s entrance stands on the other side of this void deck.  
Frequent visits to Dandelion began in December 2014 as part of my research. 
Benedict asked if I could visit regularly as many care workers were away on holiday, 
and I took this opportunity to learn about dementia care work. I spent four full-days at 
Dandelion each week over three weeks in December, and returned for weekly visits 
for the remainder of my 15-month fieldwork. In those three weeks, I was inundated by 
knowledge of direct caregiving experiences and had to make critical decisions that 
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straddle between the ethics and politics of “care” and/or research. If ethnography is 
conceived as both the process and product of fieldwork (Behar 1994; Clifford 1983; 
Freidenberg 1998), this chapter is devoted to critically reflecting upon the former. I 
begin by discussing general issues, e.g. the selection of field site. Following which, I 
discuss my use of “participant experience”, which follows an embodied methodology 
that attends to everyday practices, and my decision to analyse everyday conversations. 
I conclude by discussing difficulties of construing and/or constructing care practices 
as “moral/ethical”, “political” or otherwise. 
 
Ethnographic Fieldwork 
This thesis is based on 15 months of fieldwork at a DDC from December 2014 to 
February 2016. Research at a DDC offers a vantage point from which to understand 
“care” for OPWDs as situated within the MHH framework—between families and the 
state. Selecting an appropriate field-site was a central methodological consideration. 
Dandelion is among 16 day-care services that admit only OPWDs (Ministry of Health 
2016); others accommodate older persons of various medical and non-medical needs. 
Its location in Singapore’s most elderly-populated area—the “Central” region, with 
the highest proportion of people aged 60 and above (21.7%) (Teo et al. 2006:32)—
and longer organisational history then many other DDCs led me to privilege it over 
other DDCs22.  
I approached Dandelion in October 2014 hoping that they could introduce me 
to clients’ families as informants for my thesis’ initial direction on family caregiving 
for OPWDs. I also became a researcher-volunteer, as I believed that knowledge of the 
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DDC-family relationship would be useful for that project. However, great difficulties 
in obtaining interviews with family caregivers directed me to shift my research topic 
to dementia care work23. Benedict, the DDC manager was crucial as gatekeeper and 
key informant. As an authority figure, his eagerness to introduce me to his team and 
willingness to explain care work practices legitimated my presence. I was welcomed 
as “a student-researcher from NUS who studies ‘social’ aspects of how we can better 
care for PWDs.” His request for me to help out for an extended period in December 
2014, as mentioned, was most useful. This provided the conditions for a prolonged 
and intense period of interacting with care workers, which, when combined with 
subsequent fieldwork, allowed me to amass copious field notes and insights and made 
the shift to the current research topic on dementia care work possible.  
Following this intense fieldwork phase in December 2014, I spent one full day 
or two half-days each week at Dandelion over a period of 15 months, until February 
2016, interspersed with more regular visits during a month-long period in June 2015. 
Knowledge of Dandelion’s schedule and news of activities, such as celebrations and 
outings, which care workers generously furbished, greatly facilitated fieldwork. Early 
encounters helped in fine-tuning my research, in particular the focus on the ethics and 
politics of care work. Benedict repeatedly mentioned PCC as he showed me around 
Dandelion; care workers explained their motivations for different care practices with 
reference to PCC; and PCC and elderly mental health courses which I attended with 
care workers in early 2015 provided an official definition that diverged from everyday 
practices. Regular visits also allowed me to observe Dandelion’s relationships with 
families and state agencies, its reliance on volunteers, and the hiring of locum staff to 
relief manpower shortages. Fieldwork thus enabled me access to these otherwise non-
accessible realms of knowledge.  
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Ethnographic research is essentially a “bricolage”; I employed a mixture of 
creative strategies to access information that may be potentially useful for analysis 
(Levi-Strauss 1966:19). I followed Benedict as he “walk[ed] the ground” with guests 
and volunteers to explain the rationale of various fixtures; noted down items that are 
kept in shelves, and inquired on their uses; recorded schedules, movement charts, and 
types of medical documents (e.g. diagnostic sheets); and kept track of rules, “good 
practices”, and articles pasted onto walls and cabinets. I analysed statistical reports, 
information from government and healthcare agencies’ websites, Dandelion’s website 
and magazines, and notes from IMH courses that I attended. These facilitated the 
writing of “thick descriptions” on dementia care work, which contains “a multiplicity 
of complex conceptual structures, many of them superimposed or knotted into one 
another” (Geertz 1973:10).  
 
 “Learning the ropes” and “learning about”: An Embodied Methodology 
While heeding Geertz’s warning against assuming that we can collect data on “what is 
going on out there”, as data is always already interpreted (cf. Bernard 2002), I argue 
that there is still much value in fieldwork. Closer observations are enabled through an 
immersion into informants’ everyday lives (Clammer 1984), which are essential for 
meaning-making and generating secondary constructs (Schutz 1974). In addition to 
analysing fieldwork observations, Pink (2009) also urges ethnographers to reflexively 
interrogate their embodied experiences of participating in activities or practices in the 
field (i.e. dementia care work at Dandelion). “Participant experience”, Pink (2009:63) 
says, enables careful interpretation when researchers become “engaged through their 
participation in the environments and [embodied] practices they share with others”. 
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Particularly useful is the notion of “embodied apprenticeship”. Downey writes 
that apprenticeship is “not only an excellent way to learn a skill” but “it is also an 
ideal way to learn about it, and to learn how one learns” (Downey 2005:53, original 
emphasis). Wenger (1998:142), in a similar vein, argued for a “knowing in practice”, 
by which “knowing is defined only in the context of specific practices, where it arises 
out of the combination of a regime of competence and an experience of meaning”. 
Access into my field site, especially during those intense three weeks, required me to 
acquire the “body techniques” (Mauss 1973) of dementia care work. I found myself 
standing with my back to the wall in order to gain a panoramic view of on-goings. I 
was on constant lookout for signs of distress and illness, kept my ears open to shouts 
and complaints, and picked out smells that indicate that clients may have accidentally 
soiled themselves. My movement and posture were adjusted to clients’; I bent slightly 
and slow down when assisting clients who use walking aids, and rushed to clients 
with fall risks if they suddenly stand. As a volunteer-researcher, I tried to relate to 
clients and the environment as care workers did. As Wacquant (2005:465) suggests, 
apprenticeship is a “practical mode of knowledge transmission that gradually converts 
a novice into a recognized member of the craft through a total pedagogy imparting at 
once sensorimotor, mental and social aptitudes”. Correspondingly, analysis of sensory 
and body techniques enabled erudition of a “corporeal intelligence that tacitly guides 
social agents in their familiar universe prior to entering the plane of consciousness”.  
Care work also consists an affective aspect akin to “structures of emotions” or 
“feeling rules” (Hochschild 1979). I had to learn from care workers, who are expected 
to be patient and caring despite ceaseless questions, concerns and complaints from 
some clients (due to bad memory). I recall an excursion to Gardens by the Bay, when 
I was tasked to accompany Mr Saiful who repeated, “I want food”, “where is lunch”, 
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and “what to do?” every few seconds for an entire three hours as I held on to him and 
he wobbled from one attraction to another. I could not leave him unattended, and had 
to answer his questions patiently or he would demand to leave. I was exhausted upon 
returning to Dandelion, and asked to go home to nurse a headache. These embodied 
and affective dimensions led me to ponder on power dynamics behind care relations; 
researchers have argued for care workers’ as empowered vis-à-vis OPWDs (Gubrium 
1997; Kontos and Martin 2013), but observations and experiences of care workers’ 
enacting ethical responsibilities towards clients hint at greater complexities.  
Moreover, I fabricated stories on some accounts, as care workers did, to pacify 
clients and calm them down, and dealt with the embarrassment and self-reprobation of 
doing so (also Savishinsky 1995). Such less-than-ethical solutions to moral dilemma, 
as I show below, are part of dementia care, and sometimes led to emotional distress 
that care workers have to learn to cope with (Powers 2003; Savishinsky 1995). These 
experiences allowed me to locate the many instances where care workers are required 
to negotiate the right’s, wrong’s and grey areas of care work. I then began to observe, 
analyse and understand similar situations faced by care workers. There were instances 
that I was not able (or do not wish) to experience directly, such as when they managed 
clients who dirtied themselves24. After helping the client into the toilet, I stood behind 
the closed door and waited for instructions to fetch diapers and clean clothes. I was 
simultaneously overwhelmed by the stench of human excretion, struck by a frustrated 
care worker’s complaints in front of the client, and unsure of how to make sense of 
embodied labour for another. Knowledge generation thus extends beyond observation 
and includes “commensurability of [affective] experiences” (Garcia 2010).  
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I also learned through failure, for instance, when Agnes poked me at the back 
and chided me for being too engrossed with conducting a domino game and failing to 
accompany Mr Tay, who walked off on his own without his walking frame. Fall-risk 
clients, I remembered thereafter, required constant supervision and assistance—which 
was also useful for analysis. At one level, acute awareness of on-goings and practices 
(as an ethnographer) enabled me to learn care workers’ skills quickly, which made me 
“a volunteer who is as good as a care worker”, says Benedict. I was able to gain care 
workers’ trust as a dependable volunteer and have continued access to Dandelion. 
Furthermore, to quote Wenger (1998) and Downey (2005), “learning the ropes” also 
allowed me to “learn about” dementia care work. As Wacquant (2005:466) argues, 
apprenticeship “as a method, allows us to [study] not its products but its production; 
not the regulated strategies it informs but the coordinated techniques and patterned 
relations that form it.” Using embodied experiences as probes for further observations 
and data for analysis advances Lofland at al’s (2006:3) assertion that the ethnographer 
is “the primary medium through which research is conducted”, since I did not simply 
observe but served as a medium in multi-faceted, multi-sensorial and embodied ways.  
 
Documenting “ordinary talk” and conversations 
Analysing dementia care work as a quotidian practice parallels Lambek’s (2010:2) 
proposition of an ordinary ethics that is “relatively tacit, grounded in agreement rather 
than rule, in practice rather than knowledge or belief, and happening without calling 
undue attention to itself”. Care is involves judgments as well as mundane practices 
into which carers “descend [subconsciously] as a way of becoming moral subjects” 
(Das 2012:134). Everyday conversations, words, tones and silences that individuals 
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use in performing and communicating care, reflexively or habitually, become a good 
source of information for analysing both judgments and habitual practices.   
 “Ordinary talk” (Lambek 2010) manifests in various forms. I started by noting 
public “talk”, such as instructions issued during activities, advices given throughout 
the day (e.g. to use the toilet, or on using hand sanitizer), and conversations among 
clients and between clients and care workers. I was also asked to join morning roll 
calls, during which tasks are assigned, information shared, and reminders given. 
Benedict, nurses and care workers would articulate and debate on ideas on how care 
ought to be and make decisions on caring for particular clients. Care workers also 
invited me to join them at the kitchen for snacks in late afternoon, during which I was 
privy to their life stories, accomplishments, innovative ideas, concerns, grudges and 
complaints. These provided further research material for layered accounts of dementia 
care work (Henderson and Vesperi 1995).  
Familiarity with spaces, schedules and practices facilitated the documenting of 
observations and conversations. I had jotted headnotes in my mobile phone only when 
I am not required to help. Even so, I stood back-facing the wall and looked up at 
clients occasionally when typing. Conversations and longer notes were jotted in quiet 
spaces during lull periods, e.g. behind large cabinets or in the toilet in late afternoons. 
I felt compelled to care for clients and, to some extent, alleviate care workers of 
burdens of care work. I oscillated and alternated between the roles of “researcher” and 
“volunteer”, and experienced difficulty in solely focusing on research when other 
ethical concerns are forced to the forefront of my attention (cf. Tinney 2008).  
“Ordinary talk” sometimes occurred in formalised settings, such as roll calls. 
Given that these formal bureaucratic instances are part of care work practices, I argue 
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that they should be examined. Yet, voices and perspectives of some are more apparent 
than others in formal settings, such as when Benedict provides advice or instructions 
and care workers comply. While I observed few instances of outright disagreement, 
“small talks” (Harnett 2014) are possible sites of “sheep-like” negotiation (de Certeau 
1984) and departure from official perspectives (Coupland 2003; Driessen and Jansen 
2013; Rodriquez 2011)25. It is therefore important to attend to non-formal occasions, 
failure of which is culpable to neglecting the voices and view of some, especially the 
less empowered. For these reasons, I relied both on conversations and interviews. On 
top of the scores of conversation exchanges that I have followed and accumulated for 
analysis, I conducted 9 semi-structured interviews with Dandelion’s staffs26. Apart 
from gathering their views on “good” care, I also spoke to Benedict on organisational 
issues; nurses on how biomedical knowledge is applied; and care workers on 
experiences and difficulties of care work. However, many interviews that were meant 
to elicit care workers’ accounts of care work ended up as reiterations of official 
stances. This was perhaps the inappropriateness of using interviews to investigate 
decision-making and practices in a situation where moral stakes are so high—e.g. 
when care workers are regularly reminded of medical and PCC standards27.  
Chasms between interview and ethnographic data mirror the disjuncture 
between formalised contexts and everyday care work (Kaufman 1997). Small talks 
and conversations are thus useful in accessing areas of social life that are not provided 
in interviews or which interviews are ineffective in revealing. Comparing interview 
with conversation data, viz. “data-source triangulation”, also allows for assessing the 
validity of data sources and identifying complementary or diverging evidence (Denzin 
2009; Hammersley and Atkinson 1983). While access to intimate areas of everyday 
life is seen as a fieldworker’s accomplishment (Cicourel 1964), care has to be taken 
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when presenting data. Pseudonyms are used, and I had to reconsider including data 
that may jeopardise Dandelion’s or particular care workers’ reputation, or generate 
tensions between parties who are mentioned.  
  
 “Ethical/Moral” and “Political”: Methodological Ruminations 
Despite the afore-mentioned challenges, doing fieldwork in tandem with analysis and 
writing affords me a rethinking of conceptual categories vis-à-vis methodological 
decisions. The greatest challenge, given that this thesis is concerned with studying the 
ethics and politics of “care”, was making sense of how to conceive of 
“ethics/morality” and “politics”. Anthropologists who research on morality/ethics 
proposed three ways with which to conceive of “the moral”: where people abide by 
moral standards (deontological ethics), ethical decisions and acts by individuals 
(virtue ethics), and decisions taken in light of ethical implications (consequential 
ethics) (Fassin 2012; Lambek 2010). While these conceptualisations are instructive, 
there is, at least to my knowledge, little systematic methodological attempt to discuss 
how data on “the moral” or “the ethical” is located, captured or generated.  
 The most obvious clues of moral standards are in the form of thick instruction 
manuals in Benedict’s office, posters and articles on “good practices” on Dandelion’s 
cabinets, and constant reminders to perform PCC. But what about photos plastered 
onto walls, which remind care workers and others of the warmth of caregiving, which 
can potentially effect a reproduction of caring relations? Or should they be interpreted 
as strategies to portray Dandelion positively? What about craftwork activities that are 
conducted as part of PCC, but which artworks are marketed to charity organisations 
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and donors? As a corollary, can safety guidelines, rigid schedules, and the fervent 
management of patients’ health conditions, which may be understood via Goffman’s 
(1991) “total institution”, be reconsidered as “care”, and as moral/ethical practices?  
There is general recognition that morality and ethics are intertwined with other 
aspects of social life, particularly politics and ideology (Fassin 2012; Scheper-Hughes 
1992). Yet, scholars also pushed for an emphasis on understanding how people think 
and act in relation to their concepts of “the good”, in a scholarly context where much 
emphasis is placed on ideological structures, power relations and competing interests 
(Das 2012; Lambek 2010). I follow Fassin (2012) in arguing that while it is possible 
to locate “the moral” and “the ethical” in the everyday, it is difficult to delineate its 
boundaries. Analysis on ethics/morality must be accompanied by an inquiry of its 
relationships with social, economic and political logics. Empirically, there is nothing 
that defines an act as solely moral or ethical. Moral/ethical acts have to be interpreted 
and constructed as such by social actors as they manoeuvre through everyday life, and 
social scientists, in building secondary constructs, reinterpret these social actors’ acts, 
practices and words as moral/ethical or political (see Schutz 1974).  
Moreover, moral standards are not always actualised in practice, and ethical 
actions can be accompanied by unintended consequences. Rather than construe “the 
moral/ethical” against “the political”, it is perhaps more productive, when analysing 
moral/ethical and political practices, to rethink and problematise these practices so as 
understand the political underpinnings (e.g. structural factors or personal motivations) 
and implications of ethical acts, and vice versa. Politics or governance is indiscernible 
from the pursuit of certain governmental ideals (Foucault 2007), and power struggles 
are often fuelled by utopian visions. Ethical practices therefore have political causes 
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and implications, such as the inter-mingling of care/management and the biopolitical 
project of caring for the aged sick that I examine in this thesis. Acknowledging the 
interpretive work that is needed in construing practices as “moral/ethical” and 
“political” is therefore a necessary step towards obtaining a better understanding of 
the ethical and political complexities of social life.  
	
Reflections on Ethnographic Fieldwork and Writing 
Dementia care work, both as embodied practice and as subject of inquiry, is ethically 
and politically-charged. As a “researcher-volunteer”, interactions with clients and care 
workers, conversations with family members, and scholarly articles on dementia and 
care work remind me time and again of the vulnerability of OPWDs on one hand, and 
warned me against reducing them to their “sick roles” on the other. Care workers at 
Dandelion also experience this dilemma, which I discuss in Chapter 4, and participant 
experience (Pink 2009) enabled me first-hand experience of these difficulties and the 
resulting frustrations. Fieldwork involves a negotiation of my positionality, where I 
had to position myself vis-à-vis a multiplicity of social groups at Dandelion (Hekman 
1997; Smith 1987), and with it, develop a sensitivity of my moral/ethical obligations 
towards these groups (Tinney 2008; cf. Henderson and Vesperi 1995; Powers 2003).  
Adopting a volunteer role meant that I had to privilege the concerns of clients, 
and sometimes care workers’ priorities, as discussed, and observing and jotting down 
field notes became of secondary importance. As a researcher, I struggle to write with 
care. I am aware of heterogeneous ideas and practices even within a small community 
like Dandelion, and strive to understand multiple logics/meanings and produce an 
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account that comprises different standpoints (Abu-Lughod 1991). I show how the 
lives and works of stakeholders in dementia care—clients, care workers, families, the 
state, and myself as researcher-volunteer—are entangled through dementia care work. 
While I acknowledge that my informants’ thoughts and actions are subjected to my 
interpretation, and thus risks distortion (Crapanzano 1990), I argue that participation 
experience, “embodied apprenticeship”, attention to everyday conversations, and my 
awareness of the complexities of morality/ethics and politics help to ensure that my 
accounts are built upon empirical observations.  
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Chapter 3. Technologies of the Self for the Other 
Agnes announces at 10am, “transport is here”, and some care workers and helpers 
hurry past Dandelion’s gated entrance, some with wheelchairs and walking frames in 
tow. Dandelion’s 12-seater minivan—which fetches clients from their homes—arrives 
at the parking space outside. The group of five or six assembles near the vehicle and 
wait for clients to disembark. Dorothy, who “escorted” clients on the trip, slides open 
the door and places a half foot-tall wooden block on the ground, which serves as an 
intermediary for clients to step on as they alight. Clients who are able-bodied and 
more aware are asked to move from their seats to the door. Corrine steps forward and 
provides her arm as their support as they take cautious steps down the vehicle. Some 
helpers accompany the clients as they walk in pairs down a corridor towards 
Dandelion’s side compound (Haven 2) for morning tea. 
 Care workers’ attention then shifts to clients with more severe dementia or are 
less mobile. Dorothy unbuckles their seatbelts and instructs them to move to the door, 
step onto the wooden block, and down the vehicle. Corrine and the helpers assist by 
shielding clients’ heads from the headboard, supporting them as they alight, handing 
walking aids to some and opening wheelchairs for others. Corrine places a walking 
frame before Mr Chan, who grabs on to it, and she turns to me to ask if I can bring 
him in. With a hand grabbing the back of his pants, I greet Mr Chan and motion him 
towards Haven 2. I adjust to his pace, placing my hand on the walking frame to guide 
him in alternating between resting the frame on the ground and taking another step. 
Wheelchairs are locked in place before clients are “transferred” onto them, the means 
of which differ between clients. Dorothy extends her arms for Wendy to hold, guides 
her to the wheelchair, and waits as Wendy manoeuvres herself into the seat. Anxious 
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clients are assured before care workers transfer them into the wheelchair. Corrine then 
brings Wendy to Haven 2 and “transfers” her onto her seat at the table, where she has 
biscuits and milo alongside other clients.  
Receiving clients forms the start of a routinised schedule that also includes 
preparing meals, conducting activities, and sending clients home (see Figure 1). Care 
workers and helpers work concertedly to ensure that clients are safe and comfortable, 
watch over clients, and respond to emergencies. Dementia care work entails embodied 
labour by care workers for OPWDs, who are cared for/managed as individuals and as 
a client population. Care is expressed and responses elicited through bodily conduct, 
gestures and behaviours as individuals interact (Merleau-Ponty 1962), and these 
actions and interactions are situated in a particular “time-space” (Schutz 1974). Thus, 
I begin by describing spaces at Dandelion and its daily, monthly and yearly schedules, 
which serve as the backstage of care relations and embodied care work. Following 
this, I argue that “care” can be theorised through the concept “technologies of the self 
for the other” (cf. Foucault 1985, 1986). Care workers as ethical subjects/agents 
engage in a cultivation of their bodily practices and emotions in caring for OPWDs as 
individuals or a client population. Lastly, care work is laborious and can be regarded 
as “body work” (Cohen 2011; Wolkowitz 2002) or “body labour” (Kang 2010) for 
clients. These illustrate the entanglement of power relations with moral/ethical action 




Figure 1: Physical Layout of the Haven (Main Compound) at Dandelion Dementia Day-care Centre
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Spaces, Rhythms and Bodies: Care Work as Embodied and Emplaced 
Most clients arrive by 10am, either on Dandelion’s transport service or sent by family 
members28. Upon arrival, clients spend most of their time at the Haven (see Figure 
2)—during meals, group exercises, most activities, and when waiting for family 
members to fetch them. White florescent light fills the Haven, which, when coupled 
with its high ceiling, evokes a sense of capaciousness, devoid of claustrophobia and 
solemnity that may be associated with medical or care facilities. Paintings of 
sunflowers, orange and yellow petals settled around a heart of dark brown seeds, 
extend across a portion of its lilac walls. Hanging from air-conditioner vents are silver 
baubles installed last Christmas. 1980s music saunters in the background and melds 
with a sanitised smell, or at times the sharp odour of hand sanitisers. Benedict offers:  
We don’t want any period of complete silence. Music playing at the background 
[during meals and activities] produces a soothing comfort for clients, to soothe 
their nerves and allow them to relax, to soothe their emotions. Sometimes, you 
know, clients can get anxious or agitated.  
Two fish tanks that stand at a corner of the room serve a similar soothing function, 
especially for male clients who peer at the fish occasionally. Its beige flooring has 
some grey specks that some clients mistake for dropped items. Benedict muses:  
Sometimes, Soo-Tin and Wendy think they dropped something when they see 
the spots. It’s a safety issue, cos’ when they bend down to try to grab, they can 
fall over. So we have to keep the floor clean every time, and keep furniture out 
of the way.  
Clients’ senses and emotions are governed and regulated so as to provide a safe and 
comfortable environment for OPWDs, which also aids the control of clients’ 
“behavioural problems” (i.e. BPSDs). 
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Time/day Monday Tuesday Wednesday Thursday Friday 
8:30am First group of clients arrive in "first transport" 
8:30am 
Individual therapy session: Physical (pulley, cycling, finger strengthening exercises), Cognitive (puzzle, word search, coloring, painting, 
sorting tasks); morning tea served at around 0915am 
9:45am Second group of clients arrive in "second transport"; morning tea at Haven 2 upon arriving 
10:00am Care workers conduct morning "roll call" while clients continue "individual therapy sessions; "potting" for clients with severer dementia. 
10:30am 
Morning exercise. Clients split into two groups: (1) "active" group will move to multipurpose hall; (2) 
"advanced" group, who are usually less mobile, remain at the Haven for less rigorous physical activities.  Morning exercises (30 mins), 
karaoke/dance (30 mins) Activities would be conducted sometimes, subject to availability of manpower; usually on Wed and Thurs 
when there are large groups of volunteers 
11:30am 
Lunch (rice, three dishes and a fruit); followed by 
"potting" for some clients 
Lunch (bee hoon/noodles 
instead of rice) 
Lunch (rice, three dishes and a fruit); followed by "potting" 
for some clients 
11:45am TV sitcom and news for some clients, and news paper, cookbooks and picture books for other clients; care workers would go for lunch in shifts. Retired chinese teacher would come in to teach chinese songs to certain clients who are deemed "interested participants" twice a week.
1:30pm 
Afternoon activity (1), large group activities: Cognitive exercises (e.g. memory 
card game); Occupational therapy sessions (cooking, grocery shopping or coffee 
shop outings); sorting, and picture card discussion; birthday celebrations 
Reminiscence therapy 
(communal vs. small group) 
Dance session (gross 
movement therapy; if enough 
manpower)  
2:15pm Afternoon tea for all clients; then "cooling down" for "first transport" clients who are sent home at 2:45pm 
2:30pm 
Afternoon activity (2): Cognitive activities in peer groups (bingo, dominos, carom, jenga, poker cards 
("counting game" for those who are against gambling); singing sessions or other activities conducted by 
volunteers Movie session (comedies, 
musicals or performances)  
3:30pm Chinese sitcoms as "cooling down" for "second transport" clients or clients whose family members fetch them from the Centre 
4:30pm 
"Second transport" are sent home. Care workers (or interns) sanitise the furniture in the entire room while waiting for family members of the 
last few clients to arrive. 
 
Figure 2: Schedule of Activities at Dandelion Dementia Day-care Centre
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Occupying one end of the room are three large wooden tables, with six chairs 
at each table, where clients are seated for most activities and during meals. Clients are 
seated at these tables in the morning before group activities begin, and are allocated 
tasks—e.g. colouring pages, puzzles or bundling ice cream sticks—upon assessments 
of cognitive ability and knowledge of their habits, interests, and biographies. Many of 
them move independently to the exercise corner after finishing their task, albeit under 
care workers’ watchful gaze, although some do so only at care workers’ behest. Two 
of these tables are placed side-by-side, with shorter sides spaced a certain distance 
apart from each other and longer sides parallel to the wall. This arrangement not only 
permits clients to settle into their seats comfortably, but allow care workers to reach 
clients quickly and effectively without having to squeeze through gaps. This enables 
efficacious manoeuvring as care workers perform duties (e.g. deliver meals), manage 
threats to safety (e.g. if “fall-risk” clients leave their seats), and deal with emergencies 
(e.g. when clients soil their pants). Care workers also occupy seats along the wall as 
this allows for surveillance of movement and activities in the Haven. Conversely, this 
arrangement poses greater challenge for clients seated against the wall to leave their 
seats. Although pragmatism undergirds the arrangement, unequal accessibility speak 
of both power relations and care workers’ concern for clients’ safety.  
At 10.15am, care workers gather at the manager’s room for “roll call”, during 
which they discuss about clients (e.g. health and behaviour) and allocate tasks. A row 
of windows separates the manager’s room (and the adjacent nurses’ room) from the 
Haven, installed in place of walls, which permit care workers to oversee the Haven. 
The windows are acoustically polarised; sound enter the rooms but individuals outside 
are not privy to conversations inside. During roll call, care workers stand at the 
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door—opened wide in order to observe on-goings outside—and rush over if fall-risk 
clients stand from their seats or squabbles erupt between clients. When these incidents 
occur, suggestions on how clients can be better managed or care performed are raised. 
Benedict also urges care workers “to remember your purpose behind doing this”, 
challenge them to “see clients as persons, not as patients” despite the drudgery of care 
work, and so on. Roll calls are thus routinised events through which care workers are 
reminded of ethical ways of caring and incited to reflect on their actions. These are 
instances of “anatamo-politics”, where care workers are (re-) socialised as biopolitical 
subjects who care for/manage clients (Foucault 1980).  
Exercise is conducted at 10.30am, and clients are separated into “active” (mild 
or moderate dementia) and “advanced” (advanced dementia and less mobile) groups, 
with activities of varying strenuousness and expectations of their ability to follow care 
workers’ instructions. “Active” clients are asked to move to an adjacent multi-purpose 
hall where chairs had been arranged into three or four rows facing the front. Chairs 
with armrests are provided for clients who use walking aids, for them to use as 
support when sitting down or getting up; they are often reminded to rely on their arm 
strength since their legs have weakened. Others are asked to sit in plastic chairs, 
which are less bulky and easier for care workers to move. Chairs are arranged to form 
a circle in the Haven, and “advanced” clients are brought to their seats. Clients in 
wheelchairs are transferred onto Dandelion’s chairs, “because we want them to be as 
comfortable as possible” (Cecilia). Limb strengthening and stretching moves, said to 
benefit physical and cognitive dexterity, are conducted, and followed by games. On 
Fridays, karaoke sessions are held instead, and clients are asked to sing and dance to 
Mandarin, dialect and English songs from the 1980s. Meanwhile, rice is cooked and 
the caterer arrives with dishes for lunch. Dishes are minced and drinks mixed with 
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thickeners for a few clients with swallowing difficulties. Care workers announce at 
11.25am that lunch is ready, and clients who are mobile are asked to wash their hands 
at the toilet. Independent mobility is allowed for clients with milder dementia, without 
“fall risks”, although care workers still keep a watchful eye over them.  
Care workers and helpers accompany clients on wheelchairs or walking aids to 
their tables, and given hand sanitisers—some are reminded how to use it. Tissue is 
distributed and clients wait at their tables for food to be served. The care worker who 
prepared lunch pushes a metal trolley loaded with trays of dishes, a pot of rice and 
bowls of minced food into the Haven, and helpers gather around the trolley29. Helpers 
distribute water to clients while care workers apportion food onto their plates. A care 
worker scoops rice, announces a client’s name (for the benefit of helpers who deliver 
the plates), and passes the plate to another, who scoops dishes onto the rice and adds 
gravy for certain clients. She hands the plate to a care worker or helper, already with 
spoon in hand, who brings the plate to the client. They start with clients at one table 
and proceed clockwise until all clients are given their share, before moving on to the 
next table. Music is played and clients are left to eat and chat over lunch, except for 
some who need to be fed by care workers. Fruits are distributed when clients finish 
their meal; diabetic clients are given smaller portions. These indicate a “mechanistic 
efficiency” of how clients are seated and meals systematically served (Charras and 
Fremontier 2010; Genoe et al. 2010; Moore 1999). Yet, clients’ preferences and social 
aspects of dining are valued alongside the order and regularity of care institutions-as-
workplaces and a biomedical emphasis on nutrition (cf. Hung and Chaudhury 2011). 
The production line fashion with which food is served is matched with an 
equal mechanistic efficiency that plates are collected when clients finish eating. 
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Clients deemed to have severer dementia, and less able to manage their continence, 
are sent for “toileting”. Clients proceed to sit by the TV after lunch, except for some 
who prefer to read cookbooks and chitchat, who remain at their tables30. Care workers 
take turns to go for lunch, with at least two of them at the Haven to monitor clients 
and prepare for afternoon activities. At this time, as with other non-activity periods, 
care workers sit with their backs to the wall to observe clients, and are expected to act 
immediately when threats are noticed or accidents occur. Michelle rushed to Mr Chan, 
who is deemed “fall-risk”, when he stood from his seat, and Penny interjected when a 
quarrel erupted between clients. Surveillance is deemed important “because clients 
sometimes don’t know what’s going on, and we have to constantly lookout for things 
that can happen” (Agnes). Surveillance and intervention are elaborated in Chapter 4, 
where I discuss the particularity of care work for PWDs. 
Care workers conduct activities that involve larger groups at 1.30pm. Memory 
card games are held on Mondays, during which cards are arranged in a certain pattern 
on a white board, placed on their flip sides, and clients are asked to move up to the 
whiteboard to match similar cards. Some require coaxing before they participate, and 
there are clients who, despite multiple persuasions, prefer to sit alone outside the 
Haven. Different activities are held on other days of the week—cooking sessions on 
Tuesdays, “reminiscence therapy” on Thursdays, and “ball-room dancing” on Fridays, 
sometimes interspersed with craftwork, calligraphy and singing sessions: 
“We try to have different activities across the week. Because if you do the same things 
over and over again, just have to look at their faces... Can tell that the same activities 
can be boring. So ‘person-centered care’… When planning, we think of how to engage 
[clients] based on their interests and passion, what they used to do when they were 
younger, their occupation, whether they are housewives or engineers…” (Agnes) 
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Client who do not enjoy certain activities are often engaged in others; participants are 
chosen based on clients’ biographies, assessments of cognitive and physical ability, 
and care workers’ “observations of whether they benefit from past cooking therapies” 
(Gladys). These activities are followed by afternoon tea at 2.15pm when snacks and 
hot beverages are served; care worker consider clients’ preferences in tandem with 
dietary restrictions when preparing tea. Agnes makes coffee instead of tea, offers 
biscuits instead of bread, and bread folded one way or another, for certain clients. 
Small group activities such as domino blocks, bingo, board games and carom 
follow. On most Mondays, bingo cards and chips are distributed to clients. A care 
worker moves between tables, asking each client to draw a number chip from a can, 
announcing her draw thereafter, while others facilitate the game at each table, when 
clients need reminders of numbers drawn, help with locating numbers, or when they 
forget rules. Clients who complain when they associate bingo with gambling, which 
shows that OPWDs “have their own beliefs of right and wrong, so we don’t force, but 
give them other things to do” (Agnes). Activities end by 3.30pm, and clients return to 
watch TV so as to “cool down”. Care workers believe that activities makes them more 
energetised compared to the mundaneness of life at home; “we need to make sure they 
cool down, so won’t be too active at home… walk here and there, or open drawers or 
doors, and families complain” (Benedict). Some clients leave Dandelion with their 
helpers after activities end, and others wait until they are ushered to board the 4.30pm 
“afternoon transport” or when their family members arrive to take them home31. 
Where I had earlier posited spaces and schedules as contexts for embodied 
practices, spaces and schedules are also in fact themselves laden with socio-political 
meanings, and are mediums for reproducing ethical/power relations. This is observed 
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through planned environments for sensory governance; installation of material objects 
(e.g. gates and windows); and schedules that incorporate regularity and mindfulness 
of individual preferences. Winner (1986:23) argues that artefacts and technologies 
“embody a systematic social inequality, a way of engineering relationships among 
people that, after a time, [becomes] just another part of the landscape”. In the care 
work setting, they are both “political technologies” (Winner 1986) and technologies 
that extend care workers’ ability to care for clients. Care discourses are embedded in 
spaces and schedules, which are implicated in reproducing power and moral/ethical 
relations of care.  
 
Technologies of the Self for the Other 
In his later works, Foucault (1985, 1986) departs from his earlier focus on the self as 
constituted through disciplining and political technologies. Foucault (1988:19) notes 
that he focused “too much on technologies of domination and power” and provides a 
more comprehensive discussion of “technologies of the self”. He devises a typology 
of four “technologies”—technologies of production, technologies of sign systems, 
technologies of power, and technologies of the self (he focused on the last two)—each 
comprising discourses (power-knowledge) through which identities and subjectivities 
take shape. Earlier theorising emphasised technologies of power through biopolitics, 
where the self is produced through classification, objectification and normalisation 
(Foucault 1980). Technologies of power, Foucault (1988:18) argues, “determine the 
conduct of individuals and submit them to certain ends or domination” and involves 
“an objectivizing of the subject”. In these respects, Singapore’s healthcare provision 
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for the aged can be regarded as a biopolitical regime through which individuals and 
social institutions are organised and regulated to perform certain care responsibilities.  
 Against critiques of structural determinism, Foucault (1985) theorised power 
to include individual agency. He conceptualised “technologies of the self” as practices 
that “permit individuals to effect by their own means or with the help of others a 
certain number of operations on their bodies and souls, thoughts, conduct, and way of 
being, so as to transform themselves in order to attain a certain state of happiness, 
purity, wisdom [or] perfection” (Foucault 1988:18). This is otherwise termed “care of 
the self” or “the development… of a ‘culture of the self’ in which whole sets of 
practices of self are formulated, developed, worked out and transmitted” for knowing 
oneself and relating to others (Foucault 1986:225). Individuals, in making sense and 
negotiating with discourses (Rabinow 2005), and engaging in thoughts and actions 
oriented towards personal or social good (Laidlaw 2002), are “self-determining agents 
capable of challenging structures of domination” (McNay 1992:4). Hence, there is 
elective affinity between biopolitics and technologies of the self although neither fully 
determines the other, and “technologies of the self” belies a notion of “productive” 
power that is not based on domination. 
 While Foucault (1985, 1986) provides us with an analysis of self-cultivation 
that is loosely tied to technologies of power, his framework cannot be readily applied 
to understanding dementia care work. Foucault’s “care for the self” pertains more to 
self-cultivation rather than care for the other. As established in Chapter 1, care has a 
relational dimension; scholars adopting an “ethics of care” approach argue that care is 
fundamentally a relationship between caregiver and care recipient, which takes on a 
benevolent quality (Gilligan 1985; Held 2006; Noddings 2003). Care is conceived in 
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relation to empathy, interdependence, and sensitivity to interests of care recipients, 
especially those vulnerable to decisions that they make. Sevenhuijsen (2015:19), for 
instance, argues that “Foucault’s concept of ‘care for the self’, which he developed in 
his later work as an alternative ethos for the manifestations of both pastoral and 
disciplinary power, contains too many echoes of the (male) solipsistic subject, who 
cannot fully acknowledge the interrelatedness of human existence and the inherently 
relational dimensions of care”. Yet, an implication of theorising on “care”, especially 
evident when compared against Foucault’s works, is the non-politicisation of “care”32. 
Care is often considered a transcendent virtue that escapes power relations and offers 
a solution to domination and oppression, but is never itself political. Mindful of this 
critique, how might we critically employ the “ethics of care” vis-à-vis Foucault (1985, 
1986, 1988), for the purpose of making sense of dementia care work?  
I suggest that attention to the embodied awareness and purposeful execution of 
“body techniques” (Mauss 1972) observed of care workers when “assisting” clients 
who use walking aids provides an entry point for this discussion. This tedious practice 
requires simultaneity of attention to the client’s body, the care worker’s own body, the 
immediate environment, and several technical “steps” proffered by care workers. I 
illustrate this through an annotated account of me assisting Mr Chan from the multi-
purpose hall after morning exercise to the Haven where clients have lunch: 
I picked up the “walker” (walking frame), opened it and placed it before Mr Chan. He 
scratched his head and slowly got up from a cushioned chair. I supported him a little by 
grabbing the back of his pants (so he will not fall back, Dorothy taught me) as he 
placed his hands on the armrest and tried to push himself up. I used my foot to edge the 
walker towards him, and he moved his hands and his weight from the armrest onto the 
metal frame. As he stepped forward, I moved to stand behind him and hooked a finger 
around a belt loop at the back of his pants (so he will not fall if he trips, said Agnes). I 
informed Mr Chan that we are heading for lunch, and motioned him towards the door at 
the nurses’ room that connects to the Haven. He nodded slightly and looked down. I 
tried to slow him down a little, and placed my hand on the metal frame to guide him in 
using the walker (“he forgets how to use it sometimes, so you must do this” Agnes 
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demonstrated earlier). I ensured that the walker is placed firmly on the ground and 
waited for him to take a step forward before lifting it from the ground in preparation for 
the next step. I let go of the walker after “setting momentum” (Agnes) and watched out 
for the path ahead while Mr Chan continued using his walker. I had a hand behind him, 
two fingers hooked onto his belt loop, while my other hand directed him in the 
direction we were heading. I had asked him to stop for Alice to push a foldable table 
from the hall into the nurses’ room (to set up at the Haven) and Mr Chan continued 
moving forward after Alice made her way past us. When we got to the Haven, Cecilia 
motioned to a seat at a table nearby assigned to Mr Chan. I nodded back, and she 
proceeded to guide other clients on where to sit. Siti (a helper) saw us headed towards 
the table, pulled out the chair for us. I placed my hands on the walker and directed Mr 
Chan to stand beside the table, before reminding him to place his hands on the table 
(for stability, Dorothy taught me). He did so, as I let go of his belt loop, and he 
proceeded to edge himself along the table to a position in front of the seat. I used one 
hand to push the walker to the side, and another to support Mr Chan (by grabbing the 
back of his pants) as he slumped into his seat. Siti shifted his chair towards the table, 
and Mr Chan settled in a position where he did not have to reach too far out for his 
plate. (Field notes, 19 January 2015) 
While these procedures require care workers to exercise constant attention to their 
bodies, which demonstrates a cultivation of “body techniques” (Mauss 1972), they 
also entail attention to clients’ bodies. The different modes of assisting and “moving” 
clients attest to the embodied attention by care workers on clients’ bodies and the 
relational aspect of caring for the other (Noddings 2003). 
While knowledge is communicated on how clients should be assisted, care 
workers have different ways of assisting clients that vary depending on their training 
and observations of each client’s needs and behaviour. They extend their arms before 
Wendy when she is more awake, and wait for her to grab their arms and stand from 
her seat. She holds onto their arms as she moves slowly across the room. If they see 
that she is sleepy, tired or lethargic, they hug her from beside, tuck their arms under 
her armpits, and egg her to walk alongside them. Quite differently, they pass Siew-li 
her walking stick and hold her gently by her arm as she hobbles along; they do not tell 
her which direction to go, unless she asks. They observed that Siew-li is perpetually 
aware of her environment although she has a bad scoliosis that affects her gait and 
which compels dependence on a walking stick. This relates to Nodding’s (2003) 
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argument that caregiver is so defined because of his/her “engrossment” or deep 
understanding of the care recipient, which allows for an intimate, embodied 
knowledge of the other and how the other can be better cared for. While I quoted 
Foucault’s (1986:225) “care of the self” as “the development… of a ‘culture of the 
self’” for knowing oneself and presenting oneself to other, care relations seem to be 
built upon a “care for the other”, through knowing the other or cultivating one’s 
knowledge of the other, which also demands a cultivation of the self as the embodied 
knower and doer of this knowledge (e.g. the development of bodily comportment and 
movement, to suit the pace of clients).  
Not all clients are cared for in the same way, and some are not even provided 
much assistance. Care workers instruct some clients—frailer ones and those deemed 
less cognitively aware—on boarding and alighting Dandelion’s van and support them 
as they proceed. Others receive less guidance and assistance. Care workers rush to 
some clients at the slightest sign of them leaving their seats, while others walk around 
and use the toilet independently. On discriminating between clients, Corrine said, “we 
let them try by themselves if we think they can, but we will always have to be there if 
we think they need us. It’s a constant process of assessing, tightening or loosening up 
[procedures]”. Cecilia offered, “Mui-Chun will ask to go to toilet every five minutes, 
go, come back, then go again. So long as they can look out for themselves, she is in 
her 80s but still can make decisions and walk, so we let her go alone”. Rather than a 
blanket treatment of clients as a single category that is indiscriminately managed 
(Kayser-Jones 1995), I noticed established knowledge mediated by a contextually-
developed embodied knowledge of the other, both of which are crucial in developing 
the caregiving self. Hence, “care” can be theorised as “technologies of the self for the 
other”. Compared with Foucault’s (1985, 1986) emphasis on self-engrossment when 
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cultivating the self towards an ethical ideal, caregiving involves an “engrossment” 
(Noddings 2003) with both self and other, and caregivers cultivating their emotional 
and bodily dispositions for what they perceive as “good” for the care recipient.  
The issue becomes more complex when we recognise that care workers do not 
only care for particular clients but the entire client population in many instances. For 
instance, clients are allocated tables and seats according to their habits, languages and 
dialects, and care workers’ observations of the relationships between clients. Clients 
who were at Dandelion for years, who befriended each other, and who are mobile and 
“more functional” occupy a table. They accompany each other in activities, which 
occurs without care workers’ prompting. Agnes remarked, “some know each other for 
6 or 8 years. Cassandra and Lydia, they hold hands and go toilet, watch TV together, 
and even chope [reserve] seats for each other [during activities]… We also ask them 
to sing and dance together when we can, and many of them like it”. Ladies who speak 
Hokkien and Teochew dialects sit at another table, and clients with more advanced 
dementia and their helpers occupy a third table. Clients who often annoy others are 
also seated at the third table; for instance Kim-choo who speaks and laughs loudly. 
Dorothy explains, “she always shout so loud, and others buay tahan [cannot tolerate]. 
Siew-li will put on a frown and scold, Ah-geok will run away [leave her seat, which 
care workers deem as safety threat due to her poor vision], so we have no choice and 
have to place her here”. Clients who are intolerant of each other’s habits (e.g. 
swinging one’s legs and hitting others’ legs) are seated at different ends of a table, and 
ladies who feel uncomfortable beside men are seated next to other female clients. 
Decision-making is multifaceted as care workers are caught between valuing 
clients’ personalities, preferences and relationships, and an institutional imperative to 
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manage the client population. “Technologies of power”, manifested through the need 
to manage and govern clients (institutional forms of care), occur in parallel and are 
enmeshed with “technologies of the self for the other” by which care workers care for 
clients based upon an intimate knowledge of what is “good” for them. Decisions on 
how particular clients should be cared for/managed are undertaken in relation to care 
decision for other clients, and might fall into place in some instances (e.g. if clients 
are cordial, such as Lydia and Cassandra) but become problematic in other instances 
(e.g. when a noisy Kim-choo is seated separately). The elaborate decisions undertaken 
also show that there is a system of governance involved, that “organises clients who 
get along in one table, and those who cannot [get along] in another table, so that they 
are happy and we have less trouble… cos’ they don’t quarrel” (Benedict).  
Power relations are again surfaced when we recognise that clients do not have 
full autonomy in choosing their seats. Care workers justify this by insisting that “all 
have to be cared for, and it wouldn’t be right to prioritise some over others” (Cecilia), 
but it seems that the outcome of a decision that weighs the interests of two or more 
clients (which can nevertheless be derived from knowledge of clients) predicates upon 
the assumption that “care workers know best”. Care workers also intervene when 
tensions occur, and resolutions are made by care workers-as-mediators whose 
opinions matter most even if clients’ variegated interests are considered. 
“Technologies of the self for the other” is thus mired with, and constitutive of, 
technologies of power in the case of care work. I discuss the entanglements of care 
with management, and ethics/morality with politics in the next section, where 
technologies of the self for the other is further considered as “body work” (Cohen 
2011; Wolkowitz 2002) or “body labour” (Kang 2010).  
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Entanglements of Ethics and Politics: Body Work/labour  
Body work “involves the manipulation and touch of another’s intact body” which 
include “prone, unconscious, immobile or inarticulate bodies” (Cohen 2011:5), 
whereas body labour refers to commodified or paid body work (Kang 2010). Body 
work/labour manifest in various ways, including the transformation of care workers 
into human panopticons who onerously monitor clients in and through their bodies 
(Gubrium and Holstein 2003). Challenges of caring for both individuals and a client 
population are brought to greater attention when care workers feed clients who have 
deteriorated beyond a certain level and are scheduled for discharge. Some clients have 
eating difficulties, and feeding them can be time-consuming and gruelling. They 
require constant prompts to open their mouths and chew their food, close observation 
to ensure that they do not choke, and patience to feed them spoon-by-spoon. Corrine 
shared, “There is more difficulty in managing clients during this period. Focused 
attention on particular clients stretch manpower and resources thin. We still have to 
look around and make sure others are safe”. Agnes also taught me to “be watchful of 
one’s surroundings, and not just focus on who’s in front of [me]” when conversing 
with clients or conducting activities, “since all these are less important than, say, if 
one client falls and gets injured”. Yet, rather than focusing on particular clients or the 
general population, I observed care workers doing both—looking behind clients’ 
shoulders to monitor other clients while trying to focus on the task at hand, which 
attests to the challenging body work required.  
Surveillance itself requires the embodiment of certain body techniques (hence, 
technologies of the self for the other), and constant effort to exercise such techniques 
(body work). Surveillance is performed with the intention of “making sure that you 
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know what everyone is doing, and they are not in danger”, especially clients who are 
granted more autonomy, because “we let some walk around, but we to make sure they 
don’t trip, no wires around, that the place is safe. And they are not stumbling, in case 
they are unwell” (Agnes). For other clients with “advanced dementia” or “fall risks”, 
surveillance more evidently serves as a means for active intervention: 
Dorothy: We keep our eyes on them and see what they are doing, because you 
don’t know what can happen to them. Especially the fall-risk ones, Mr Chan, 
Mr Chew, you have to watch them more carefully. Because, if you don’t, and if 
they fall...  
Me: Ok, because they fall? 
Dorothy: Yeah, have to make sure they are safe… Sit, don’t walk around or 
have their tongkat [walking aid]. And make sure that there are people with 
them. If they don’t have helpers, we must go with them to toilet. Even those 
who can walk, we don’t let them walk about too much. Our eyes must follow 
them. 
Me: How come? And what do you do? 
Dorothy: (Sigh) Some of them, the more naughty ones, will walk around. If they 
walk out, then we follow them and make sure that they don’t go and follow 
people out of the door. Then, there are some clients, eyes not good but still can 
‘run marathon’ [never stop walking about]. So we have to make sure that they 
don’t fall and accidentally hurt themselves.  
Care workers run towards clients with fall risks who try to leave their seats, and bring 
them back to their seats. They also walk alongside clients who “wander”— used by 
psychiatry to describe PWDs who walk around, and who are allegedly disoriented—in 
an effort to persuade them to return to their seats. These care practices are effortful 
because clients would insist on going home, or pander to care workers’ persuasion but 
only to return to “wander” minutes later. Care workers often resort to sitting beside 
clients, “using our body to block clients [from leaving their seats]” (Dorothy) as they 
call it, and conversing with them or explaining away their reasons for wanting to 
leave, all of which are physically and emotionally draining.  
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Furthermore, some care workers make a constant effort to inject laughter and 
banter into the otherwise serene (and a tad sterile—1980s music sauntering in an air-
conditioned room) environment. Dorothy teases Mui-Chun about the “heaps of gold, 
silver and pearl adornments” that she puts on and Wan-Ling about her “darling” 
(husband) coming to pick her, which generates giggles and laughter from these clients 
and others in the room. She dances around playfully and cajoles clients to participate 
activities (e.g. memory card games), and leads them in singing songs and rhymes in 
English, Chinese and dialects. Michelle had sat by Mr Saiful and asked him to teach 
her Malay—he was a Malay and English teacher—and conversed with him about 
notable figures such as Lee Kuan Yew and Mao Zedong, who he calls his childhood 
friends. Care workers sit with him in an effort to “keep him occupied, so he wouldn’t 
walk around” but also “because we don’t want him to just be alone, with no one to 
talk to” (Michelle). These chuckles, cheerful banter and laughter that percolate the 
Haven during activities and care workers’ efforts to develop a “positive environment 
for clients to be comfortable” (Benedict) contrasts with depictions of care institutions 
as “the last resort of those who can no longer help themselves” and which “symbolise 
rejection and… rub the salt of neglect into the moral wounds of marginality” 
(Savishinsky 1991:1; also McLean 2001; Foner 1994). That “body work” not only 
involves surveillance and intervention, but also an infusion of joviality and humour, 
which can be laborious, demonstrates that care workers engage in “emotional labour” 
(Hochschild 1983) for the care of clients’ emotional wellbeing.  
The gruelling nature of dementia care work that entails care workers’ “body 
work/labour” (Cohen 2011; Kang 2010; Wolkowitz 2002) and “emotional labour” 
(Hochschild 1983; Lopez 2006a, Lopez 2006b) are met with care workers’ complaints 
that extending personalised care to each client is cumbersome and/or impossible. 
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They occasionally chuckle and cry out, “ai si” (“want to die” in hokkien), alluding to 
the backbreaking experience. At other times, they shake their heads and wonder aloud 
the impossibility of attending to some clients who are difficult to care/manage, or 
complain of hassles experienced earlier in the day, saying that they “don’t care 
already” (but of course, they continued caring for clients). As I demonstrate in 
Chapters 4 and 5, expectations of how care should proceed are shaped vis-à-vis both 
PCC and Dandelion’s position in the MHH framework, and constant reminders to 
abide by PCC ideals—e.g. during roll calls (which espouse clients’ autonomy and 
empowerment)—and also be watchful of clients (thus limiting autonomy) adds to the 
arduousness of dementia care. However, many care workers spoke of “satisfaction at 
the end of the day, when you see that clients are happy” (Agnes) and that “we play an 
important role in [clients and families’] lives” (Cecilia). This mirrors Rodriquez’s 
(2011:265) finding that care workers “particularly appreciated working with residents 
[who are] difficult to control”, as the occasional sense of accomplishment provides 
care workers with “resource to manage the strains of their work lives”.  
While perspectives on power relations shed light on some aspects of dementia 
care work (e.g. Diamond 1992; Foner 1994; Gubrium and Holstein 1999; Kontos and 
Martin 2013; McLean 2001), sensitivity towards laborious aspects of “technologies of 
the self for the other” invites consideration of how ethical action and power relations 
intersect. McLean and Perkinson (1995:147) despite their critical account of dementia 
care work, do not deny that working with and caring for PWDs “is extremely difficult 
and demanding. It requires resourcefulness, energy and intelligence, and it is under-
valued”. This chapter demonstrated the physical and emotional work/labour required 
of care work that overlaps with “technologies of the self (care workers) for the other 
(clients)”, which advances this argument. Care work entails a cultivation and exercise 
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of body techniques (Mauss 1972), and “engrossment” on both the self and the other 
(Noddings 2003). In recognising the bodily demands of dementia care work and care 
workers’ negotiation with moral/ethical responsibilities, the notion that care workers 
are empowered in relation to clients is problematised.  
  56
Chapter 4. “Precarious Minds” and Paradoxes of Care 
Dementia care work is essentially the “minding”—care or management—of persons 
with “precarious minds”—persons whose behaviours are seen in terms of cognitive 
impairment and decline. I begin this chapter by narrating an example of “minding 
precarious minds”, of Dorothy coaxing Wan-ling, who usually asks for her husband, 
into returning to her seat: 
“Sit down and wait. Your husband will be here in a while to pick you up. He’s 
having coffee downstairs and asked you to wait here,” Dorothy shouted from 
across the room to Wan-ling, who tried to leave her seat. Wan-ling motioned to 
the telephone that sat in a corner of the table in the nurses’ room, for the third 
time in the past ten minutes, as she tried again to explain, “But he doesn’t know 
that I’m here, better for me to…” Brows slightly furrowed and lips pursed, 
Dorothy stood up from beside Wendy, sound asleep on a couch, and walked 
over to Wan-ling who stood half-crouched, hovering above her seat. “Come, 
let’s try calling”. Elated, Wan-ling stood up and followed Dorothy. Dorothy 
passed her the phone handset, which a gratuitous Wan-ling took in one hand. 
She dialled with the other hand, put the handset to her ear, and waited. 
“So, is Wan-ling calling her hubby?” I asked Michelle who sat beside me. 
Flashing an awkward smile, she offered, “No, she can’t ‘call outside’ without 
pressing 9 first, ‘cause the phone call won’t get through.’ She explained as we 
watched Wan-ling redial the number, “we let her try so that she’ll feel more at 
ease. We’ll tell her that her husband is busy [when the call does not get 
through], or else she keeps saying that she wants to leave. We can’t only attend 
to her, because we have others to look after.” With that, Michelle got up from 
her seat and walked to another table to assist her colleague in moving a client 
from his chair to a wheelchair. After two more tries at calling Wan-Ling’s 
husband, Dorothy told Wan-ling that her husband is busy at work and that she 
should not disturb him. This persuasion worked more effectively than the other 
one (husband having coffee), and Wan-ling was coaxed into returning to her 
seat. She tried to leave her seat again later, and Michelle moved a chair to sit 
beside her—which blocked off her path of exit—and engaged in a conversation 
with clients at her table. (Field notes, 11 February 2015) 
While the preceding chapter discusses care practices as “technologies of the self for 
the other”, this chapter deliberates on the significance of “dementia” and PWDs—as 
care recipients, or “the other”—for care practices. Monitoring movements, fabricating 
  57
stories, keeping clients to their seats, and other “techniques of the self for the other” 
predicate upon certain beliefs held by the caregiving “self” of the cared-for “other”.  
 This chapter discusses the implications of understandings of “dementia” (or 
“precarious minds”) for care work. I begin by elucidating care workers’ ideas of 
dementia as “precarious minds”, followed by notions of “personhood” promulgated 
by the PCC movement and practised at Dandelion, and conclude with an analysis of 
what these mean in relation to care/management of PWDs. I argue that if technologies 
of the self (and technologies of the self for the other) alludes to an ethics/politics of 
“life”, put otherwise, the governance by living individuals on themselves (and others) 
(Foucault 1985, 1986; Dean 1999), OPWDs fall short of being governable subjects 
due to (the discourse of) “precarious minds”, and are relegated to positions of passive 
care recipients. The PCC movement attempts to reincorporate PWDs into the orbit of 
an ethics/politics of “life” by “placing [PWDs] at the centre of academic and practice 
discourses” (Innes 2009:13), but are impeded by care practices that perpetuate ideas 
of precarious minds. I also observed that the “personhood” that is sometimes accorded 
alludes to clients’ pre-dementia personality, which introduces complexity to the issue 
of whether PWDs can indeed be constituted as self-governable agent-subjects. Hence, 
PWDs who are related to and cared for vis-à-vis their “precarious minds” are 
relegated into a “state of exception” (Agamben 1998, 2005), where their inability to 
make decisions and perceived vulnerability (inability for self-care, hence the need for 
care provision) are emphasised, and social norms that govern interaction among non-
PWDs are not extended to them—e.g. they are told fabricated stories.   
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Dementia and the Language of “Precariousness” 
Dementia is an umbrella term for a number of conditions that biomedicine categorises 
together due to their association with cognitive degeneration (Innes 2009); cognitive 
decline occupies the nucleus of a biomedical definition of dementia (Kaufman 2006; 
McLean 1995). Biomedical definitions are relevant at Dandelion insofar as clients are 
grouped into “mild”, “moderate” or “severe” dementia; in addition, they are classified 
into “active” or “advanced”, “fall risks” or otherwise, and so on33. Clients are placed 
into groups for morning exercise and reminiscence therapy and selected for activities 
and fieldtrip based on evaluations of their cognitive and physical ability, which often 
has dementia categorisation as a reference. Using these categories as reference, care 
workers also decide whether certain clients need more assistance or management than 
others. For instance, toileting schedules are kept for “severe dementia” clients, but 
clients with mild dementia and mobile are free to use the toilet independently.  
Care workers, unlike biomedical professionals, tend to adopt quotidian modes 
of understanding that refer to clients’ bodily behaviour, rather than biomedical terms 
of Alzheimer’s disease, vascular dementia and fronto-temporal dementia (cf. McLean 
2010). My observations show that dementia care work involves caring and managing 
OPWDs, and the biomedical language of neurodegenerative disease, cholinesterase 
inhibitor, and abbreviated mental tests adopted by doctors is rarely used. Clients’ 
abilities and inabilities to perform daily activities (e.g. walking, eating, and using the 
toilet) independently and safely are of greater importance to care workers. Cecilia 
explains during our conversation on dementia screenings, “we can’t expect screenings 
[for assessing cognition and signs of decline] to mean everything because a lot, such 
as their habits, are not captured. Not that we don’t rely on screening, but screenings… 
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still do not tell us everything”. Agnes also said “we know who are what (category), 
but it is not accurate to just base it on this. We have to look at how clients behave”. 
Thus, evaluations of clients, although mediated through biomedical lenses, depend 
more heavily on prolonged observations and interactions—“getting to know them”, as 
Cecilia calls it, which again implies “technologies of the self for the other”.  
Care workers’ training and recruitment also explain the emphasis on clients’ 
behaviour as opposed to biomedical categories. Unlike doctors and nurses, newer 
generations of HCAs—HCAs make up most of the team that comprises two nurses 
(see Appendix 2)—only receive basic biomedical training prior to recruitment, and 
this training overlaps with “learning on the job”, which Benedict explains “is more 
important given the nature of this job”. Older generations of care workers, such as 
Dorothy, only learn about care work upon entering the profession, although some, in 
Agnes’ case, had worked at nursing homes. Rather than comprehensive training on 
aetiology of dementia, their training involves identifying “behavioural problems” and 
caring for/managing PWDs. Hence, their concerns are expressed through a vocabulary 
that ranges from clients “can’t handle” or “needs help”, to complaints of “poor 
memory” and “don’t know what they are doing”. These are accompanied by chuckles 
(amusement, perhaps), pursed lips, furrowed brows, or shaking of head (in disbelief). 
Quotidian concerns and expressions are shaped by but irreducible to biomedical 
notions (e.g. “mild”, “moderate” or “severe” dementia) (Sinha 1995; cf. Bond 1992; 
Estes and Binney 1989); biomedicine is just one mode of reference to which care 
workers recourse when making sense of OPWDs’ behaviour.  
Care workers at Dandelion believe that “people with dementia still hold on to 
bits and pieces of themselves, even as their memory continues to worsen” (Benedict). 
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Dorothy mentioned, “You see clients becoming more ‘serious’, some faster and some 
slower. [Cassandra] can play the piano last time, but now she cannot already”. This 
attests to their conception of clients’ subjectivities as “precarious”—intact but in a 
perilous state (“you don’t know how they think and what they will do”, said Dorothy), 
with an expectation that their cognitive ability will decline with time. There is still 
some recognition for clients’ subjective states, more for some and less for others, as 
opposed to an outright denial of their cognitive ability and OPWDs’ “loss of self” (cf. 
Cohen and Eisdorfer 2001; Dresser 1994). Yet, this conception of “precariousness” 
guards against overly optimistic views that PWDs are treated the same as non-PWDs, 
given that care workers conceive and respond to OPWDs in terms of their inabilities 
at times. As I will now illustrate, care worker’s understandings of “precarious mind” 
are (re)produced through care work experiences and interactions with clients. 
Ting-ting was seated at the table of Hokkien and Teochew ladies in late 2014 
when I started fieldwork. As they shared gossips and complaints, each client steered 
the conversation according to her experiences, rendering their exchange nominally 
coherent. Once, Siew-li spoke of her cleaning job aboard a cargo ship and her 
appreciation for men who helped to carry cargo. Ting-ting then interjected with a 
cautionary note that women must be wary of men, chiding her “daughter” for eloping, 
which then led them to talk about their sons and daughters. Care workers observed 
silently, joining the conversation at times, and only intervened if quarrels occur or 
when Ting-ting asks for her “daughter” (her helper). Ting-ting was able to eat without 
assistance, and was left to flip through cookbooks after lunch and knot raffia strings 
onto baskets alongside others. She could still walk, used the toilet with her helper’s 
assistance, and care workers kept watch over her in case she “wanders”.   
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Ting-ting’s dementia worsened rapidly in the first few months of 2015. By late 
April, she was less able to communicate, and stumbled as she walked. Care workers’ 
response, in terms of new approaches to care for/manage her and how they spoke of 
her worsening condition, sheds light on care workers’ understanding of and 
interaction with clients through the discourse of “precarious minds”: 
(I arrived at 1.10pm, and the afore-mentioned ladies were seated at their table. Dorothy 
sat at a far-end of the Haven, watching over clients.) I greeted Siew-li and Ting-ting, to 
which Siew-li looked up from her cookbook, took my hand and replied, “good boy. 
Hope that things will proceed smoothly for you” (in Hokkien). Ting-ting did not 
respond but mumbled to her helper who did not reply; she then picked up some books, 
shuffled them, and placed them back. Siew-li pointed to a French dish in the cookbook 
she held, and said, “lunch was nothing as good… fish, prawn, what’s this?” I jokingly 
asked, “grandma, won’t you treat me to this?” to which she chuckled and replied that 
she will cook for me soon.  
We chatted and laughed for a couple of minutes, during which I tried to include Ting-
ting in the conversation but unsuccessfully. Then I saw that Ting-ting was struggling to 
stand up. Her helper went forward to assist her as she hovered above her seat. Excusing 
myself from Siew-li, I went to Ting-ting and asked, “where do you want to go”, to 
which she gestured to her lower abdomen and repeatedly mumbled, “go toilet” and “oh, 
my bones are old and aching”. I pushed away the chair and held her right arm while the 
helper supported her left arm. She furrowed her brows and continued mumbling as we 
cooed, “slowly” and encouraged her to stand. She remained in a stiff crouching 
position as she got to her feet. In that position, with us supporting her arms, Ting-ting 
continued mumbling and staggered towards the door. 
Dorothy appeared at the door with Ah-geok in tow—they just came from the toilet, I 
surmise—, opened the door for us, and asked Ah-geok to sit at one of the tables. Ting-
ting reached out her hands and tried to grab Dorothy, but she chuckled and jumped 
away, only to return and offer to accompany Ting-ting and her helper to the toilet. I 
watched from behind as Dorothy grabbed her pants (supporting her), and instructed her 
to “lift your leg” (step forward) as they walked to the toilet. Ting-ting laughed and 
mumbled a “thank you” as she staggered into the toilet with her helper’s holding onto 
her. I asked Dorothy about Ting-ting’s declining condition as we closed the toilet’s 
door behind them, and she shook her head and said, “what to do?” I described the 
incoherent mumbling and her complaints of joint pains, and Dorothy said, “we don’t 
know. Her mind is getting worse. Next they will even forget how to walk. Nowadays 
she keeps complaining about her body rotting. We also headache, don’t know what to 
do.” Dorothy then shouted to the helper to ask if everything was alright, and waited at 
the toilet’s door while I made my way back to the Haven. (Field notes, 30 April 2015) 
I was caught unaware by Ting-ting’s declining condition, and had clumsily tried to 
bring her to the toilet. Dorothy, conversely, knew of her “mind becoming worse” and, 
in recognition of her worsened condition, grabbed the corner of her pants and gave 
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precise instructions (“lift your leg”). Dorothy’s anticipation that “next [she, like other 
clients] will even forget how to walk,” indicates her belief that Ting-ting’s current 
condition is subject to further decline. Dorothy’s understanding of “precarious minds” 
thus predicated upon her understanding of Ting-ting’s behaviour, which also led her 
to employ suitable body techniques to assist her.  
It is not uncommon for debilitating effects of dementia to descend upon clients 
through the passage of time, and for care workers to respond accordingly, which may 
in turn feed an expectation that clients’ cognitive ability will deteriorate. Cecilia also 
said when we spoke about Ting-ting, “now, we have to keep in mind her condition 
and react. She was able to do more by herself last time… we can keep a looser watch. 
Now we need to observe and see what happens.” Ting-ting’s condition deteriorated 
such that by late 2015, she had to be fed by care workers and wheeled to the toilet for 
periodic toileting. While she used to sit with others, she now sits by herself in an 
armed couch with an over-chair table, which prevents her from leaving her seat. Care 
workers would sit with her as they watch other clients, holding her arm and chatting 
with her as she struggles to string words together. Care workers know, however, that 
“some of the clients, because they are not Alzheimer’s, remain the same even after 
many years. Lydia, Allison, Mr Lim”, said Dorothy, “last time, Cassandra, but now 
she also became worse”. Cecilia explained that some clients are “diagnosed with VD 
[vascular dementia] and they usually do not get worse over time, although some may 
still exhibit some kind of decline”. As such, there is still uncertainty even for those 
who “usually do not get worse”, who are also screened periodically, and are thus also 
labelled as “precarious minds”. Care experiences, observations and understandings of 
“precarious minds” enfold upon one another, and (re)shape norms of interaction and 
care relations. On one hand, care workers’ attentiveness to clients’ behaviour and 
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concern for clients implicitly reinforce notions of “precarious minds”. On the other, 
(subsequent) observations of difficult behaviour, interpreted through the lens of 
“precarious minds” that paint cognitive decline as a predestination, evoke an attendant 
reconfiguration of embodied relations between care workers and clients. 
The reshaping of norms of interaction is most evident in care workers’ use of 
fabricated stories to placate clients when they demand to return home to care for their 
sickly mother, go to the market for grocery shopping, or pick their grandchildren from 
school. One client frequently complains of theft, and another that her “daughter” (her 
helper) wandered off alone. In many instances, care workers respond by pandering to 
clients’ versions of reality, for instance, by telling a client that her daughter informed 
Dandelion that she has the “stolen wallet”, or they kept the wallet in the nurses’ room. 
They develop these narratives through knowledge of clients’ biographies, families and 
habits, partly derived from PCC projects, in an effort to soothe client’s emotions and 
govern their behaviour. Apart from complying with scenarios that clients identify as 
“real”, the contents from clients’ narratives also provide materials for the “making” of 
stories to convince clients to adopt certain courses of action. In the above example, 
Wan-ling was informed that her husband, who works while she is at Dandelion, is 
“having coffee downstairs” so as to placate her and get her to remain in her seat. She 
was later allowed to call him, with care workers ensuring that the phone call does not 
get through. At other times, they inform her that her husband called to say that he will 
arrive by 4.30pm, knowing that he usually comes before 4.30pm and Wan-ling will be 
assured when she hears that her husband called. Rather than suggest that fabricated 
stories (and actions) do not work for non-PWDs (which they might), I argue that care 
workers will not, due to honesty and other ethical reasons, offer these stories to non-
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PWDs. This does not mean that care workers are dishonest or unethical, but certain 
moral/ethical norms are suspended in social interactions with PWDs. 
While lying is unethical in many other situations, care workers regard the use 
of fabricated stories as quintessential to dementia care work. To be sure, care workers 
often tell clients the truth initially, such as “your daughter will come at 4.30” or “your 
helper went back and will pick you when the transport sends you home”. In Agnes’ 
words, “the first step is to recognise their anxieties, frustrations… Maybe last time, 
some emotional experience cause them to remember certain things, which now keep 
coming up”. However, truths do not always work, for instance, when “[clients] are 
preoccupied [with their worries] and repeatedly ask for their husband or daughter or 
want to leave” (Corrine). The truths “may not coincide with their version of reality”, 
says Benedict, “and sometimes we have to try some other way”. In some instances, 
care workers see worried faces and clients leaving their seats (“wanting to go home”, 
“looking for daughter/husband”, and “sundowning34”, they say), and they offer half-
truths or fabrications so as to placate them. If care workers are not busy, these are 
accompanied by efforts to “divert” client’s attention from their worries, e.g. engaging 
clients in activities, conversing with them, and bringing them for walks. When care 
workers are busy with other tasks, fabrications may also serve as convenient means to 
get clients to remain in their seats so that care workers do not have to attend to them. 
Myriad interests from managing clients expediently to catering for their wellbeing 
prompt care workers to provide clients with alternatives to the truth. 
As such, “lying” or telling fabricated stories, which is usually an infringement 
of moral/ethical norms, becomes seemingly “normalised” in a dementia care setting. 
However, there is occasional uneasiness among care workers, who cringe, blush or 
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exchange uncomfortable glances when presenting clients with “lies”. Cecilia shared, 
“Of course we feel bad that we have to tell lies to clients. All of us don’t like being 
lied to, but sometimes we have no choice”. She explains that some clients become 
frustrated or agitated when confronted with truths that do not resonate with their 
version of reality. There was once when Siew-li pointed to a photo of her pasted on a 
wall at Dandelion and said, “see, that lady in green sweater? She’s my mother...” She 
snapped at me when I asked, “Isn’t that you in that photo?” and I had to apologise 
before she continued her story. In another instance, when Siew-li insisted on returning 
home to care for her 100-year old sickly mother, Michelle told her that her daughter 
had fetched her mother to the doctor, and assured her that her mother is alright. 
Michelle saw me watching, winced a little, and explained with a chuckle, “what to 
do? Can’t tell her that her mother is ‘no longer around’ [has passed on].” These tell of 
emotional distress when care workers are caught in ethical dilemmas and compelled 
to act in knowingly less-than-ethical ways however practical they may be. Benedict 
explained that “lying” is part of dementia care that staff members have to adapt to: 
All of us face some difficulty when we first join (chuckles). I conduct feedback for new 
staff when they join, to find out whether they can cope. Michelle, at the end of the first 
week, came up to me, “this is so difficult. I tell more lies this week than I have for the 
whole of my life” (chuckles). But what can we do about this? We can’t make the 
clients agitated so we have to follow their view of what is true. Some time later, we just 
become more natural at this. 
In addition to suspension of norms of interaction, word and actions that are commonly 
regarded as ethical violations are redefined as good and proper care. The same might 
be said of care workers’ active surveillance and intervention, which are both violation 
of privacy and autonomy, and generous dispensing of care. With reference to Chapter 
3’s discussion, these also represent care workers’ body/emotional labour for clients.  
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OPWDs are not treated solely as “precarious minds”, and care workers also 
relate to clients in terms of their deteriorating health and physiological changes due to 
old age. Yet, care workers believe that dementia hampers OPWDs’ ability for self-
care, which thus leads to increased attempts to care, manage and intervene, e.g. when 
care workers are mindful of “fall risks” clients standing from their seats. I had quoted 
Corrine saying, “we let them try by themselves if we think they can, but we always 
have to be there if we think they need us”, and Cecilia mentioning, “So long as they 
can look out for themselves, can make decisions and walk… we let [them] go [to 
toilet] alone”. The converse is also true: clients are granted lesser autonomy and 
privacy, and subject to more supervision and intervention when they are deemed 
unable to care for themselves. The extra care and attention that elide into surveillance 
and management are by no means extended to non-PWDs. Much of these are based 
on anticipations of OPWDs’ actions, justified through an emphasis on past behaviour, 
and which further demonstrates the persistence of “precarious minds”. This discourse 
is increasingly challenged through the PCC movement that calls attention to patients’ 
“personhood” against a biomedical emphasis on cognitive decline. 
 
The Person-Centred Care Movement: Reshaping Understandings 
Developed in the late 1980s, social psychologists sought to “place the individual with 
dementia at the centre of academic and practice discourses” against “decline, decay 
and deficiency models of dementia commonly espoused by those working within a 
broadly biomedical approach” (Innes 2009:13). This came to be known as PCC, and 
Kitwood (1997) and Sabat and Harre (1992) are among the pioneers in proposing the 
relevance of PCC for dementia care35. Sabat argues that social roles and relationships 
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of PWDs are sidelined through the use of psychiatric tests in identifying cognitive 
ineptitude (Sabat and Harre 1992; Sabat and Collins 1999). Kitwood (1997:8) also 
states that “personhood”, which he defines as “a status bestowed upon a human being 
by others, in the context of relationships”, is jeopardized by “personal detractions”, 
such as “labeling, intimidation, objectification, and mockery”. He calls for attention to 
PWDs’ autonomy and respect for their decisions, and argues that PWDs must be 
accorded “recognition, respect and trust”. In many ways, PCC can be regarded as a 
challenge to notions of “precarious minds”. As I shall elaborate, the PCC movement 
attempts a shift from a language of care that underscores client’s vulnerability to one 
that emphasises their personhood, agency and autonomy.  
This movement became popular in Britain and the United States through the 
1990s (Innes 2009), and gained traction in Singapore in the 2000s. Healthcare and 
social services agencies in Singapore developed guidelines on PCC, e.g. the “Person-
Centered Approach Toolkit” (Social Services Institute n.d.). The IMH also conducts a 
module on PCC as part of its Aged Psychiatry Community Assessment and Treatment 
Services (APCATS) courses. Yet, PCC is taught alongside other modules, such as 
“psychotic disorders in the elderly”, “dementia management” and “BPSDs”, which 
represent a greater part of the curriculum (Institute of Mental Health n.d.). I attended 
some modules alongside care workers from eldercare agencies and IMH’s dementia 
wards in 2015, and noticed that trainers struggled to articulate the relevance of PCC in 
the face of biomedical and psychiatric hegemony. The term “patient” was used 
despite PCC’s critique against reducing persons to sick roles, and biomedical terms, 
e.g. “wandering” and “sundown syndrome” were employed in other APCATS 
sessions. Trainers urged care workers to devote greater attention to understand 
patients and proposed ways in which they could “deal with patients” more tactfully. 
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Yet, it was unclear how PCC could proceed smoothly when management of BPSDs is 
part of dementia care, and trainers acknowledged these difficulties. The IMH sought 
to make PCC “relevant” and “practical” for care work settings (to quote a trainer), but 
this led to chasms between IMH’s version of PCC and that proposed by Kitwood 
(1997). There was confusion and debate among participants during the discussion 
session, and the trainer struggled to answer questions on how “behavioral problems” 
can be managed. These indicate the difficulty of translating PCC ideals into practice. 
Dandelion adopted PCC in early 2014, about a year before my fieldwork 
started, after Benedict and care workers were introduced to PCC through courses and 
discussions with other VWOs. Early initiatives had care workers acquire biographical 
information on clients from their families to learn about their pre-dementia lives. 
Organised efforts were made to understand clients and their behaviour in light of their 
biographies before the onset of dementia “in order for us to talk to them about family, 
work, school, and things they can recall and are interested in” (Benedict). Benedict 
requested volunteers to produce photo collages and “guided biographies” of clients; 
the latter involves clients sharing their experiences based on prompts from volunteers. 
Clients are given activities that resemble pre-dementia lifestyles: Mr Tay (ex-Chinese 
teacher) and Wan-ling (Chinese-educated) to complete worksheets and grade each 
other’s papers, Mr Lam (ex-engineer) was asked to piece together building blocks, 
and female clients to participate in cooking sessions36. Care workers develop lists of 
participants based on (1) clients who are expected to be present (most visit Dandelion 
only on certain days), (2) knowledge of clients’ cognitive/physiological capacity and 
behavioural problems, and (3) clients’ identities, as gendered, classed (e.g. education, 
past occupation) and ethnic (e.g. Mandarin-, dialect- or Malay-speaking) persons. 
Activities are planned so as to prevent repetition and ensure that every client has a 
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chance to participate in some activity or another. Apart from organising activities, 
knowledge of clients’ biographies is used to develop fabricated stories in attempts to 
pacify or cajole clients towards certain courses of action, as discussed. 
PCC brought about increased attention to nuances of clients’ behaviours, and 
care workers attempt to understand otherwise incomprehensible actions as remnants 
of clients’ past—meanings are given to actions and behaviour that might otherwise be 
regarded as signs of clients’ debilitation. In making their actions comprehensible, “we 
see them less as sometime who’s incoherent, but similar to us, they are capable of 
thought, even if most of it remains in an earlier part of their life” (Cecilia). Veronica 
expressed while we stood by Wendy, who was folding napkins used for mealtimes:  
“Wendy used to be a nurse when she was younger. In the past, nurses in the 1960s 
and 70s would sterilise those gauzes, those for cuts and wounds, take them out from 
microwaves, then fold them. What you see now is actually Wendy folding gauzes... 
(Gazing at Wendy, who wiped the table with her hands in a circular motion to the 
right and then to the left) See, you can see that she’s actually a very clean person… 
She will wipe the work bench once in a while, then start folding again.” (Veronica, 
ex-nurse) 
Hence, the PCC discourse directed care workers to recognise seemingly unintelligible 
behaviour, which might otherwise be seen as symptoms of dementia, as indications of 
clients’ personhood. Agnes mentioned, “It’s not true that they don’t know what’s 
going on. Sometimes they do, just that they have meanings of their own that we don’t 
understand”. This alludes to “technologies of the self for the other”, since interpretive 
work is performed by care workers in an effort to understand and care for clients vis-
à-vis PCC ideals. Yet, this also indicates a denial of BPSDs (which only occurs when 
clients’ behaviours do not pose problems to care workers), and recognition of PWDs’ 
personhood only insofar as “personhood” and “dementia” can be compartmentalised. 
Hence, “the ‘then’ self” is valued over over “the ‘now’ self” (Post 1995), which 
corresponds to a disavowal of the subjectivity and personhood of PWDs in their 
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present states (Dresser 1994). Does a PCC approach that values personhood and 
autonomy, and which juxtaposes itself against biomedical perspectives, have space for 
recognising post-morbid personalities? In the subsequent paragraphs, I discuss the 
difficulties that care workers face when putting PCC into practice when caring for 
individuals and a population with cognitive and behavioural difficulties.  
Dorothy shared that although activities such as supermarket trips, craftwork 
for artistically-inclined clients, singing classes and calligraphy were introduced since 
Dandelion adopted PCC, care workers recognised clients’ habits and interests even 
before PCC was formally adopted. They consider clients’ relationships when planning 
activities; deciding seating arrangement; and asking friends to dance or sing alongside 
each other during birthday celebrations and pose for photos during outings. These pre-
existing practices are, however, (re)framed by new ways of “seeing” and incorporated 
into new ways of “knowing” defined by PCC (Foucault 1970). Discrete care practices, 
described above, assume coherence within the PCC discourse, and are appropriated as 
rationales that “person-centred” ways of caring for PWDs are possible. Dandelion’s 
adoption of PCC as standard par excellence represents an articulation of moral/ethical 
ideals, where none was previously available. Care workers are now more aware of 
how they relate to and care for clients. In Cecilia’s words, “[they] see more 
responsibility” to respond to clients according to ethical precepts of PCC, “to show 
attention to clients, to acknowledge and affirm them. To understand how they really 
feel even when what they do sometimes may not be so reasonable”.  
Care workers are also urged to “focus on what clients are capable of doing”, 
rather then only recognise their inadequacies (Benedict). Mr Tay, who is categorised 
as having “mild dementia”, is encouraged to lead activities alongside care workers—
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but like other clients, his condition is monitored by care workers—and care workers 
request for Wan-ling, a self-trained masseur, to massage their arms and teach them 
massage techniques during less busy hours in the afternoon. While Benedict described 
these practices and those that “allow clients to be independent as much as possible”—
described in Chapter 3—as “empowering clients, because many of them still have the 
ability to do things and care for themselves”, I argue later that such “empowerment” 
and “autonomy” are contingent upon prior evaluations of cognitive and physiological 
(in)capacities—i.e. their “precarious minds”—rather than entirely shorn of biomedical 
and institutional precepts. Hence, PCC encourages care workers to better understand 
clients and develop ways of granting “autonomy” and “empowerment”. These efforts, 
some of which existed before PCC was implemented, are also used to testify that PCC 
for PWDs is possible. While these success stories are encouraging, they conceal other 
ways in which PCC for PWDs are problematic, which I now discuss.  
As mentioned, client’ (usually pre-dementia) biographies are considered when 
care workers develop lists of participants. For Chinese singing sessions conducted by 
a retired teacher during lunchtimes, for instance, Allison, Ting-ting, Wan-ling, Mui-
Chun and Ah-leng are usually included because they are Chinese-educated. Michelle 
explains that Lydia is excluded “because she is nonya [Peranakan] and never go to 
school”, Ah-geok because of poor vision, and Cassandra “because she doesn’t know 
Chinese (she is Caucasian)”. Yet, there also are those who are excluded because “they 
won’t know what’s going on”, or “are better to be here [at the Haven] with the 
helpers” (Michelle); these clients are then seated at their tables, with care workers 
beside them, and given waste paper to tear or sticks to bundle. For cooking sessions 
on Tuesdays, to cite another example, Li-ping, Ah-leng, Lydia, Wan-ling and Xin-ling 
are often included and are tasked with trimming ends off beansprouts or given butter 
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knives to cut ingredients that were pre-boiled and soften. Care workers or helpers sit 
beside, watching over and chatting with them as they go about their tasks. Gladys, the 
OT, offered during one session, while frying vermicelli and turning periodically to 
check on clients: 
Gladys: Many of them are wives and mothers. Grocery shopping, cooking, and 
preparing dinner is what they used to do. They find meaning in doing these. So if they 
are still capable of helping out, I try to get them to. Helps to keep them active. 
Me: Yeah, many of them talk about how they still cook at home… 
Gladys: (laughs) Yeah, cooking is still a part of their personality. They are happy 
talking about it. Then you can try asking them about recipes, some of them can 
remember. (Handling a frying pan) Maybe we can also get Ah-leng to help fry later. I 
think she still remembers how to… Some, like Lydia, maybe not… But for those who 
do, we see that they enjoy it. 
Cooking sessions are moments when care relations between clients, helpers, (mostly 
female) care workers and Gladys develop through gendered identification, embodied 
acts of food preparation and cooking, and sharing of experiences (Marte 2007; Sutton 
2010). While these interactions are generative of intimate, embodied knowledge and 
inter-subjectivity between care workers and clients—akin to technologies of the self 
for the other—there are institutional conditions on who can participate—“if [clients] 
are still capable of helping out”—and institutional concerns of safety (activities are 
supervised and clients are given blunt knives). Ideas of “precarious minds” still persist 
in the selection of participants, and clients are watched over by care workers.  
Developing lists of participants and making decisions on activities that clients 
can participate are instances when “personhood” is recognised, accorded and/or 
denied. Care workers still take notice of cognitive “decline, decay and deficiency” 
(Innes 2009:13), which results in exclusion of some OPWDs from certain activities on 
the grounds that they will not benefit. Decisions are derived from care workers’ 
understandings of clients’ capabilities and behavioural difficulties apart from an 
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awareness of clients’ habits and interests. For clients with severer dementia, such as 
Ting-ting, concern for her safety outweighs autonomy, hence care workers’ efforts to 
watch over her and provide timely intervention. They also experience difficulties in 
eliciting opinions, and decisions are made in her place. The same goes for Ahmad—
whom I accompanied for the outing to Gardens by the Bay—who “forgets what is 
said to him [and what he says] within seconds… and got to closely watch him when 
outside, cos’ he always wants to go home”, said Michelle when she saw how tired I 
was after the trip. Agnes quickly exclaimed, “then next time don’t bring him, cos’ he 
also doesn’t like [flowers]. Bring someone else, easier to manage”. PCC is practised 
within limits inscribed by care workers’ understandings of clients’ “precarious 
minds”. The shift from a language of care that emphasises clients’ vulnerability to one 
that emphasises personhood and autonomy is therefore fraught with many difficulties.   
 
“Precarious Minds” and the “Politics of Life” 
Foucault argues that as opposed to modes of power that operate through coercion and 
domination, such as sovereign power’s authority to “let live and make die”37, modern 
biopower operates through the “politics of life” (Fassin 2009; Rose 2001). It involves 
“[bringing] life and its mechanisms into the realm of explicit calculation and [making] 
knowledge-power an agent of transformation of human life” (Foucault 1980:13). At 
the macro level, biopolitics entails systematic observation and categorisation of the 
population—healthy and sick, young and old, productive and infirmed, etc.—through 
surveys, technologies and policies implemented by a range of social institutions from 
clinics and hospitals to schools and workplaces. These shape the practices of living, 
thinking subject-agents who are socialised into and govern themselves—anatamo-
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politics and technologies of the self—, vis-à-vis governmental objectives. In other 
words, “life itself” has become the determining basis of modern politics, and modern 
governance is a “politics of life” (Fassin 2009; Rose 2001).  
Healthcare is a modern governmental project, where the making of a healthy 
society proceeds through self-regulating health-conscious individuals who engage in 
health food campaigns, health movements, etc. (Bunton, Nettleton and Burrows 1995; 
Petersen and Lupton 1996). The centrality of subjectivity and agency to healthcare 
governance is exemplified through Armstrong’s (1983) study of social surveillance 
that underpins 20th century public health projects. Individuals and their relationships 
are seen as vessels for transmitting diseases as well as sites for re-education and 
regulation. Discourses are communicated through relationships for enculturation with 
regards to personal hygiene, e.g. spitting, hand washing and sneezing, which improve 
governmental efficacy (Armstrong 1983). Hence, public health agendas are advanced 
through a network of ethical agents and their respect for their own health and others’. 
Permeation of ideas of “good health” and “good life” is enabled via thinking agent-
subjects in this “politics of life”.  
If subjectivity and decision-making are constituents of biopolitics, the status of 
PWDs—whose abilities to care for themselves is doubted—in the biopolitical regime 
is accordingly called into question. As persons whose cognitive ability is questioned 
and capacity to think, act and make decisions is problematised, clients are seemingly 
relegated to the position of passive care recipients. In contrast to care workers who are 
biopolitical subjects in the MHH framework (which I discuss in Chapter 5), clients, as 
non-self-governable persons, are not active subjects of biopolitical governance. This 
is reminiscent of Agamben’s (1998, 2005) theorising of “state of exception”. While 
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Foucault (2008) argues that sovereign power is succeeded by biopower, Agamben 
(1998, 2005) contends that “letting live and making die” remains a feature of modern 
governance. Sovereign power, Agamben (1998) argues, operates through defining 
certain targets for political exclusion, such as illegal immigrants, refugees, inmates on 
death row, patients on life support, and human cadavers. These populations occupy a 
liminal position, are suspended from and unprotected by laws, exempted of political 
status, and disregarded as persons (Agamben 1998). In effect, they are exposed to 
violence, which illustrates the sovereign state’s capacity to “make die”. The creation 
of a state of exception, Agamben (2005) insists, is as essential to governance as the 
presence of “citizens”, as governance requires the spelling out of governable entities 
as well as those who are excluded from its political reach.  
Just as sovereign laws and rights are suspended for persons who are relegated 
to a “state of exception”, the discourse of “precarious minds” holds PWDs in a liminal 
state where expectations and norms of interaction are suspended. Understandings of 
“precarious minds” locate PWDs as vulnerable and provide a rationale for an exercise 
of power through constant surveillance and management, decisions on including or 
excluding them (for activities), and use of fabricated stories. While governance 
predicates upon clients’ sensory awareness and attempts to shape their courses of 
action, clients are nonetheless regarded as persons whose behavioural problems have 
to be managed. Moreover, overly generous care/management and telling of lies are 
infractions of norms in ordinary situations. Fabricated stories, rather than immoral, are 
bread and butter of dementia care work, thus seen as an ethical alternative to truth-
telling that allegedly causes clients distress. Through these practices and ideas, the 
emphasis on “precarious minds” allows for suspension of ordinary norms, and permits 
a generous dose of care/management by care workers—thus relegating PWDs to a 
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“state of exception”.  Yet, against Agamben’s (1998, 2005) formulation, it cannot be 
said that PWDs are “abandoned to violence”. Clients are subjected to a “state of 
exception” while also constituted as objects for (overzealous) care/management. Care 
workers, although empowered agents, engage in bodily and emotional work/labour; 
and clients are both care recipients and persons whose privacy and autonomy are 
compromised. Therefore, moral/ethical and power relations between care workers and 
clients differ somewhat from Agamben’s (1998, 2005) theorising. One arrives at 
different conclusions on whether certain care practices are justifiable depending on 
whether one adopts a perspective that values autonomy, or one that recognises PWDs’ 
vulnerability and the need for care (mired with management). 
The PCC movement attempts to emphasise “the person in dementia” (McLean 
2007), but its success in challenging the “state of exception” is ambivalent at best. On 
one hand, vulnerabilities experienced by clients due to dementia, mixed with ideas of 
how “precarious minds” should be cared for, interpose PCC ideals of autonomy, trust 
and empowerment. As mentioned, understandings of “precarious minds” and clients’ 
vulnerabilities are produced through “technologies of the self for the other”, which at 
times generate an impetus to care for/manage them. Torn between a hegemonic PCC 
discourse and concern for clients that stem from their caregiving experiences, care 
workers are caught on a tightrope between relating to clients as “precarious minds” 
and ensuring their personhood. The PCC discourse that challenges extant care work 
practices is thus faced with many difficulties and contradictions.   
Moreover, the important question of whether clients are treated in relation to 
present or pre-dementia personalities is neglected. Attempts to understand clients vis-
à-vis their pre-dementia selves suggest a less-than-welcoming attitude towards PWDs 
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and dementia as an illness. As Dewing (2002:159) argues, “the PWD is both invisible 
and lacking a here-and-now voice… Exclusion through valuing the ‘then’ or past 
person is as good as saying that PWDs are inferior beings”. While this exclusionary 
ethics was employed by PCC’s proponents to argue against biomedical and 
institutional forms of care, this critique can equally be levied against attempts to put 
into practice a reformulation of PCC that is shorn of critical interrogation of (pre-
dementia and dementia) “personhood”. Behavioural difficulties are still treated as 
BPSDs, and PCC has not found a way to incorporate them into a schema of “care” 
except to deny and reinterpret them as non-malignant behaviour, but only through 
reference to clients’ past. PCC’s attempt to challenge the “state of exception”—and 
perhaps reinsert PWDs into a “politics of life” (Fassin 2009; Rose 2001)—remains 
tenuous unless it refines its conception of “personhood” and “care” through serious 
(and critical) rethinking of how persons with dementia can be related to and cared for.  
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Chapter 5. State, Market and the Biopolitics of Care 
“The incidence of dementia has been steadily increasing and there are more elderly 
people living with dementia due to significant increase in life expectancy… A greater 
burden of care for elderly patients with dementia is therefore imminent, urging 
healthcare professionals and policy-makers to search for cost-effective and accessible 
healthcare options that will meet the care needs of people with dementia and enhance 
their quality of life. This has also prompted the emergence of strategies and services 
geared toward deinstitutionalization and community living of individuals with 
dementia.” (Vaingankar et al. 2013:1605) 
“Ultimately, as it is society who bears the cost, the government’s role is to design a 
system that maximizes the value and health outcomes from the available resources. 
Given the market imperfections in healthcare, the government needs to incentivize the 
right behavior on the part of providers and patients, provide central planning and 
coordination to ensure efficiency, build capability for the future, and educate patients.” 
(Lai 2016:88)38 
The first excerpt, by IMH’s researchers, expresses the state’s response to population 
aging and the greater prevalence of dementia in modern nation-states like Singapore. 
The government foresaw socioeconomic consequences of “problems of the aged” in 
the early 1980s, which led to the development of a slew of policies to care for/manage 
the aged and aged sick (Teo et. al. 2006). As Lai (2016), MOH’s Deputy Secretary, 
indicates, these policies seek to optimise economic objectives vis-à-vis “health 
outcomes” and care provision. The state’s attempt to “maximize the value and health 
outcomes” and “incentivize the right behaviour on the part of providers and patients” 
clearly denotes biopower in healthcare provision, much of which proceeds through the 
MHH approach. In this chapter, I consider two aspects of how dementia care work at 
Dandelion is shaped by the MHH approach: (1) how state ideals of financial prudence 
and service improvement shape care work, and (2) how client-service provider 
relations between families and VWOs gives importance to families’ expectations on 
how care work should be performed.  
Analysis follows from my argument that the MHH approach is a “biopolitical” 
regime (Foucault 1980) in which families, VWO social services and the community 
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are organised by the state, each accorded roles and responsibilities, to provide care for 
the aged sick. The MHH framework defines VWOs as autonomous service providers, 
but the non-profitability of service provision and shallow pockets generate a reliance 
on state-provided infrastructural support and subsidies, which in turn warrants the 
abidance of certain guidelines and regulations. Dandelion, as a service provider, also 
respects decisions of family members as primary caregivers and their demands for 
institutional care. Care work, which I conceptualised as “technologies of the self for 
the other” provided for care recipients (as “precarious minds”) take shape within the 
context of this MHH biopolitical regime.  
 
The “Many Helping Hands” Approach as a Biopolitical Regime 
A parliament report dated 26 December 1978, presented by then Health Minister, 
opened with this statement: “Changes in our population size and age structure will 
influence the planning of future health services”, cited evidence that “the present 
number of 160,000 old people aged 60 years and above will rise to about 190,000 (7% 
of total population) in a decade and 270,000 (9% of total population) in 20 years”, and 
concluded that population ageing and age-related illnesses will impose great demands 
on Singapore (Parliament of Singapore 1978b). He did not elaborate these “demands” 
but his concerns were reiterated by then Social Affairs Minister as (1) first generation 
migrants who are in “lowly paid jobs and often are prematurely unemployed”, almost 
“half of [whom] have accumulated less than $1000” in CPF (provident fund) savings; 
(2) “the break-up of extended family and loosening bonds of filial piety” which may 
lead to more aged citizens “who will require extra-familial care”; and (3) the aged 
sick approaching welfare services, “when nothing can be done for them medically” 
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(Parliament of Singapore 1978c). These concerns are again surfaced in Vaingankar et 
al. (2013) and Lai’s (2016) statements three decades later, quoted at the start of this 
chapter. Dementia epitomises the age-related illnesses that the state seeks to manage, 
since the long-term care that is required places a strain on individuals’, families’ and 
the state’s finances (Lai 2016), and BPSDs can make caregiving difficult (and may 
complicate an alleged breaking down of families that is already observed).  
The state’s recognition of population ageing as an economic and political 
problem meant that issues of the aged/aged sick and caregiving for them—including 
OPWDs and dementia care—, which were minor concerns when the aged constituted 
a far smaller proportion of the population, rose to greater importance (Teo et al. 
2006). These used to be personal issues that did not exist in the state’s agenda. Yet, 
“from the moment they were coordinated with a regime of truth”—viz. “population 
ageing”, as revealed by demographers—, they “bec[a]me something” that warranted 
biopolitical governance (Foucault 1980:19). An ensemble of policies and practices 
accompanied the constitution of ageing, age-related illnesses and caregiving as 
governmental problems. The Committee on the Problems of the Aged (1982-1984) 
was established, followed by a sequence of Panels such as the National Advisory 
Council for the Aged (1989-1997) and the Inter-Ministerial Committee on Healthcare 
for the Elderly (1997-1999), and each sought to resolve broad concerns or specific 
issues envisioned by the state. The MHH approach was one of these solutions. 
Although “many helping hands” was explicitly used only in the 1990s, policies and 
ideologies had existed since the 1980s, which functioned to pull together families, 
VWO social service providers, the community and the state. As an orchestration that 
comprises various social actors—from families and community to VWOs and charity 
bodies—organised through ideologies, policies and material (dis)incentives, and 
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oriented towards a state-specified goal of caring for the aged/aged sick, the MHH 
approach is a biopolitical project par excellence.  
 The MHH approach espouses a hierarchy of responsibility of caring for the 
aged and aged sick: individuals and their family are primarily responsible, followed 
by VWOs, and state assistance is regarded as a last resort (Mehta 2004; Wong et al. 
1999). Against worries of “weakening family ties [and] a large number of aged 
persons who are estranged from their children” and “filial piety [becoming a problem] 
with the next generation who may have become tainted with alien values” (Motions, 
Problems of the Aged, 2 July 1984), the state actively asserts the family’s importance, 
especially of grown children, in taking on primary care responsibilities for the aged 
and aged sick. This was effectuated through numerous policies from the 1980s to the 
present, e.g. moral education, tax incentives for adult children who live with aged 
parents, housing purchase benefits for children who live near aged parents, and the 
“Maintenance of Parents” Act (Chan 2008; Teo 2006, cf. Hamilton 1990)39. Inter-
generational responsibilities for co-paying healthcare bills are signalled through 
legislations that allow for transfer of MediSave (mandatory national medical savings) 
monies between spouses, children, parents and grandparents. Eligibility for Medifund 
(means-tested state-financed assistance scheme) funding at the household level serves 
as further indication that the aged sick should approach their families for financial 
support before approaching the state. Therefore, a plethora of ideologies and policies 
buttress the notion of “filial piety”, which becomes both assumed and expected of 
families, and cast families as primary caregivers of the aged sick.  
  Correspondingly, VWOs are akin to paid hands that play supportive role vis-
à-vis families. Ng, Mehta and Rowlands (2006) estimate that 18% of Singaporean 
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families approach day-care and rehabilitative centres. These account for 50% of the 
utilisation of healthcare and social services (e.g. home nursing, hospice care, and meal 
deliveries). VWOs were encouraged to start “homes for the aged” since the 1970s, 
“provided these organisations follow the [Ministry of Social Affairs’] guidelines for 
the establishment of such homes”, as it grants the benefits of “[cutting] down costs for 
the Ministry and also allows the responsibility of taking care for the aged to be shared 
by other welfare organisations” (Parliament of Singapore 1979). The history of 
religious and community-run social services in pre-independence Singapore serve as 
grounds for arguing that charitable act are best provided by VWOs (even denying that 
paid work is involved) and the community rather than the state: 
Helping the aged, providing care and support for the aged… is not something that we 
can get by setting up a Government department, build an old age home and then put the 
people in… Looking after the elderly, particularly sick elderly, is a labour of love, of 
compassion, of charity. I do not think, whatever we may feel about our own people, 
that we can buy this by employing people on a regular salary basis. It has to be done, as 
I say, by people who have got the missionary zeal, who have got the compassion… 
And we make it clear that Government is neither the most effective nor even an 
efficient organization to do these kinds of services. The missionary, the religious, the 
voluntary and philanthropic societies can do very much better and probably at very 
much lower cost. (Motions, Problems of the Aged, 3 July 1984) 
Debates ensued with regards to setting up more nursing home facilities—there were 
only 21 homes for the aged in 1978—, waiver of lease and state subsidies for utilities, 
and establishment of guidelines for social service provision (Parliament of SIngapore 
1978a), but VWOs remained autonomous from the state.  
The shift towards geriatric medicine and treatment of chronic illnesses in the 
1990s spurred initiatives to develop nursing home, day-care centres, respite services, 
and hospital geriatric services (Lee and Satku 2016; Mehta 2002). The New Horizons 
Centre, “a day-care centre for the mentally-infirmed elderly or elderly people 
suffering from senile dementia”, started in March 1991, is among these initiatives and 
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indicates that dementia and OPWDs are gradually recognised (The Straits Times 30 
December 1989; 28 November 1990). Clients of these services are referred from 
biomedical institutions via the National Council of Social Services (NCSS) (and later 
AIC). IMH provides training for care workers and staff members, and MOH conducts 
periodic audits to ensure that their operations are in order. State definitions of what 
constitutes good and proper “care” are transmitted through training and reinforced 
through legislation and regulations—which I later discuss—in addition to roll-calls 
and reminders, discussed in Chapter 3. These developments were accompanied by 
“step-down care” for the treatment of less urgent illnesses outside hospitals, and the 
push for “integrated healthcare” that saw the coordination of hospitals, VWOs and 
other social services in the 2000s (Lai 2016; Teo et. al. 2006). By 2014, the social 
services sector, comprising VWO- and private-run services, has expanded to include 5 
community hospitals, 3 chronic sick hospitals, 66 nursing homes, and 4 hospices that 
house more than 12,000 beds; 57 rehabilitation and day-care centers, and 16 DDCs; 
and 18 homecare providers (Ministry of Health 2016). These services, together with 
families and state agencies—given that they account to the state and/or constrained by 
state regulations—form a biopolitical regime for the care of aged sick in Singapore. 
 As indicated by Lai (2016) and argued in Chapter 1, a biopolitics of healthcare 
is matched by a biopolitics of healthcare financing. With co-payment and MediSave 
as central features of Singapore’s healthcare financing, healthcare expenditure has 
been kept to 3% to 4% of its GDP from late 1990s to present, which is very low by 
standards of developed countries (Lim 1998, 2004; Gill 2013). Donations from the 
community are a substantial source of social services funding. The Commissioner of 
Charities (2015) reports that social and welfare VWOs received $388 million from 
donations, which represents 26.6% of the sector’s revenue. Moreover, approximately 
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$614.1 million (42.1% of sector’s revenue) is derived from programs and services, 
which indicates that much of the sector’s revenue is still obtained from its customers 
(i.e. aged sick and their families). Government funding, on the other hand, amounts to 
$456.3 million (31.3% of sector’s revenue). This amount would be higher if not for 
co-payment and community donations, which points to the state’s efficacy in 
organising various sectors of society to provide for the aged sick. Through policies, 
legislations, and ideologies, families, VWOs, and the community are brought together 
to perform various roles, such that these groups function fairly efficiently as cogs in 
this well-oiled biopolitical machinery. Subsequent sections elaborate on Dandelion’s 
interactions with state agencies and families, where I demonstrate the micropolitical 
mechanisms of the MHH biopolitical regime.  
 
State Governance and its Implications on Dementia Care Work 
Economic Constraints and Reliance on the State 
In an interview one afternoon, Benedict saw me glancing at the list of 10 to 12 names 
on a whiteboard behind him and offered, “These are names of people who AIC gave 
us, but we are not yet able to take in”. Corrine shared on a separate occasion that AIC 
allocates people who were diagnosed with dementia to DDCs such as Dandelion, who 
are placed on a “waiting list until clients leave or we have additional manpower to 
cope with more clients”. She explained that existing clients can be discharged if they 
develop medical conditions that require hospitalisation; if “screenings show that their 
conditions worsens, and they are better cared for at nursing homes”; or “if we see that 
they no longer benefit from activities”. There is also a “dilemma when dealing with 
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admission”, says Benedict, which involves “balancing of whether to let more [clients] 
in, and whether we are able to provide good quality care with existing trained people”. 
Benedict contacts families/PWDs on the list when vacancies are available; following 
which PWDs are “put on [2-day] trial sessions” for care workers to assess if they are 
suitable for admission. Some PWDs and families wait for months before there are 
vacancies, and assessments take up another few weeks40. Dandelion’s management of 
demand for caregiving against the availability of resources and manpower bespeaks 
an economic role vis-à-vis AIC and families/clients.  
VWOs are granted relative autonomy (and also, responsibility) on financial and 
operational matters, subject to guidelines and regulations by the state. VWOs, akin to 
many sections of the healthcare sector that were corporatised since 1987, are expected 
to “pursue corporate discipline while retaining the public service mission and ethos” 
(Lee and Satku 2016:25). The state assists by subsidising construction and operational 
costs (e.g. utilities), but refrains from directly contributing to care provision. Although 
not fully commercialised as it receives state funding, Dandelion manages its expenses 
and manpower, decide on client admission, and compete with other VWOs to provide 
better services. Put otherwise, it assumes corporate responsibilities. The dozen names 
on Benedict’s whiteboard point to the issue of inadequate supply against higher 
demand faced by Dandelion as a corporate entity. This issue is recognised by the 
state, as could be inferred from Lai’s (2016:88) statement that “providers have to be 
adept at identifying and prioritising urgent cases to the top of the queue to be seen 
more quickly, so as not to compromise their care”. This demonstrates a continuation 
of the problem identified by Mehta and Vasoo (2001), that hospitals and social 
services face difficulties in allocating services to families in need, as demand greatly 
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exceeds supply. Hence, moral/ethical practices of care provision are entwined with 
economic issues of resources and labour (cf. Held 2004).  
Referencing the demand-supply issue, I asked Benedict later in our conversation 
whether “market forces” affect how Dandelion admits and provides for clients. He 
curtly replied, with little hesitation, that: 
You see that we run a lot of programmes, but we actually run on low budget, actually 
budget deficit… For many years already, what we get as revenue is lesser than 
expenses. So it’s not only that we don’t make any money, but also we are making a 
loss. Some might think that I am not being prudent, but again, it boils down to what we 
think we are here for… A lot of the cost goes to manpower, which is a “must” if we 
want to maintain a healthy caregiver-client ratio. We want to give careful attention to 
our clients. So I don’t think that we operate based on market logic. (Looking back at 
the whiteboard) We think about who we want to admit, but that’s not based on how 
much clients can pay us. And for some clients we even fork out from our own pocket 
[Dandelion’s resources, as opposed to state subsidies], for lower-income group clients. 
So it is important to adopt a mentality that, you know, we are here to provide for clients 
and also the [neighbourhood’s] community, for those who need our care. 
His words reveal that economic implications of state policies are felt at Dandelion 
even as he denounces market presence. Benedict hesitates to accept more clients until 
more manpower is available, and argues for a ratio of “one HCA for every six clients 
with mild dementia, and one to four for moderate and advanced [or severe] clients”, 
which amounts to the maximum of 25 clients that Dandelion receives daily, many of 
whom only come on certain days of the week. The need to decide between admitting 
more clients and providing attentive care for lesser clients—Dandelion chose the 
latter—spells an issue of resource allocation. 
It appears puzzling, from an economic perspective, that Dandelion continues 
to operate despite loss and even extends assistance to families who have difficulties in 
paying for its services. Based on Dandelion’s financial report for 2013, “government 
grants and subsidies” provides 20% of its revenue, and Dandelion obtains most of its 
funds from individual and corporate donations (about 48%) and fundraising (20%). In 
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both cases, however, healthcare costs are incident upon society, albeit funded through 
charitable rather than mandatory basis (e.g. taxation), only that the onus in gathering 
funds rests upon Dandelion. Dandelion’s budget deficit in past years also shows that 
an autonomous, less state-reliant approach does not quite resolve the cost of providing 
dementia care. Rather, the responsibility and burden of managing resources and risks 
of not having sufficient funds are shifted from the state to VWOs. Apart from greater 
reliance on VWOs to gather resources, the state’s strategies in organising populations 
and institutions, and “optimising” their roles in financing care for the aged sick 
(Foucault 1980, 1985, 1986) also enabled healthcare expenditure to be kept low at 3% 
to 4% of the GDP. Yet, the consequences of insufficient funds are in turn incident 
upon the aged sick and their families through longer waiting times (cf. Lai 2016). 
Apart from a biopolitics of healthcare financing, insufficient resources also facilitate 
the governance of VWOs towards service improvement and the adoption of its ideas 
of “good care”, which I next discuss.   
 
Reliance on the State and Biopolitical Efficacy 
When working with tight revenues, Dandelion has also to “look for smaller grants, 
whenever we can, from the government for our programmes” (Corrine). This shows 
the financial constraints that Dandelion and arguably other VWOs face, and the need 
to “source miscellaneous grants… because we have to spend on things like manpower 
which can’t be avoided when providing care” (Corrine). Nearly 70% of its revenue—
donations and fundraising amount—are sourced through Dandelion’s efforts. State 
assistance is only one among many sources of funding, but which is nonetheless 
pertinent when faced with a dearth of resources. Corrine explained on our way back 
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from a fieldtrip to Gardens by the Bay, “before we plan for outings, we first have to 
apply for grants. The government have these schemes that set aside money for VWOs 
to carry out activities.” She elaborates, “We come up with the plan, including how 
many seniors, staff and volunteers will go, to where, and so on, then we request. And 
it’s quite generous, but (her emphasis) the only thing is we can only use this money 
for things that we specify. So we don’t have to use our own money, but we also 
cannot use it for other things.”  
Bureaucratic guidelines ensure that money is not used for purposes other than 
stated in the funding application, which not only serves to ensure accountable use of 
public resources but also acts as a means to govern VWOs’ activities. Only activities 
that the state approves will be funded, and for causes that are deemed appropriate. For 
example, volunteers’ entrance tickets are covered, which supports the MHH ideology 
for community involvement in caring for the aged sick. Subsidies are also provided 
for care workers to attend courses or attachments at healthcare agencies, hospitals and 
other VWOs; Dandelion’s care workers are encouraged to attend at least two courses 
yearly. It is unsurprising for the state to assume this responsibility, since proficient 
workers are central to the healthcare system. State definitions of appropriate reasons 
for funding, and the content of courses conducted demonstrate state involvement in 
shaping care provision. VWOs are given autonomy to conduct activities, gather funds 
and manage manpower and organisation. Yet, this (ostensible) autonomy is regulated, 
in one manner, through funding schemes that define activities and practices that are 
desirable from the state’s perspective, and in another, through guidelines and audits 
that more palpably and less discretionarily express the state’s regulatory intent.  
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It was stated in 1979 that it is desirable for VWOs to continue operating aged 
homes, “provided [they] follow the (Ministry’s) guidelines for the establishment of 
such homes” (Parliament of Singapore 1979). The state still holds the reins over 
certain areas of care provision at present, as can be noted from its insistence of 
providing quality care for the aged in addition to earlier examples: 
“We are also working to improve the quality of aged care. In 2012, we set up a nursing 
home work group to review existing standards and identify areas that could be 
enhanced. They have commenced their industry consult, and we hope to introduce the 
enhanced standards by 2015. Meanwhile, industry-led work groups have also been set 
up to similarly review the community care and home care sector. In parallel, we are 
working to develop new models of integrated and people-centred care that cater to 
seniors’ health and social needs.” (Ministerial Committee on Ageing, 21 October 2013) 
As mentioned in Chapter 4, PCC gained traction in Singapore in the 2000s, and it was 
promulgated by IMH among other healthcare agencies. Dandelion had its first audit 
by MOH in February 2015, and there was marked attention in ensuring that Dandelion 
is “safe, risk-free, and appropriate for clients” and “clients feel at ease and can move 
around by themselves” (Benedict)41. PCC practices are encouraged, and PCC posters 
are placed throughout Dandelion. Benedict offered, “The audit helps us make sure 
that we are on par with MOH standards, which are also set for other centres. And not 
just be on par, we always challenge ourselves to provide what we can, to treat our 
clients as persons.” He then cited Kitwood’s seminal work and shared about dementia 
care services in other countries that attempted PCC with some success. Care workers 
spoke less about PCC—they were more concerned about putting PCC into practice—
but occasionally cited guidelines learned at IMH’s PCC courses, especially in the 
weeks immediately after the audit and IMH courses42. However, the effects of IMH’s 
courses and MOH’s audits were still observed months later. In a conversation in late 
2015, for instance, Agnes exclaimed, “Here we make an effort to know our clients as 
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persons” and compared Dandelion’s practices with those at nursing homes where she 
worked. This shows the continued efficacy of state biopolitical governance.  
Benedict also mentioned the import of audits for obtaining the state’s financial 
support: “We have to do well, at least meet their standard, because it helps us become 
one of the centres with MOH. This helps us get money and support.” Audits are 
regarded as an avenue for obtaining state funding, which in turn compel Dandelion to 
evaluate and improve their services according to state-advanced ideas. Hence, funding 
schemes and audits appear discretionary until we recognise that VWOs’ financial 
constraints generate reliance on state funding. Adherence to state-advanced standards 
is important as Dandelion derives financial benefits from meeting these expectations. 
This illustrates the subtle yet strong influence of state biopolitical action in shaping 
and regulating decisions at Dandelion. Correspondingly, audits, as regulatory practice, 
are pivotal in ensuring that guidelines are followed. VWOs that do not adopt the 
guidelines or are unable to meet expectations are negatively evaluated and excluded 
from financial advantages. However, beyond these guidelines, Dandelion and its care 
workers reflect upon and engage in PCC in their own terms (Chapters 3 and 4) and for 
their own reasons (i.e. financial benefits), which allude to “technologies of the self” 
(Foucault 1985, 1986). Audits and courses organised by state agencies provide an 
impetus for care workers to engage in PCC, and perhaps other care discourses if those 
are advanced by the state, but actualised practices are still subject to “thinking 
through” by care workers. 
The corporatisation project, undertaken by healthcare institutions (HCIs) from 
late 1980s to the 2000s, assumes that financial independence drives competition and 
organisational development towards the state’s objectives. Lee and Satku (2016:25) 
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describe this project as “allowing a greater degree of autonomy so that HCIs will have 
greater responsiveness to needs of the population they serve [and are] empowered to 
pursue strategies to optimise care and yet remain efficient and sustainable”. It also 
assumes that HCIs can generate adequate revenue and profits to engage in service 
improvement. These assumptions may be tenable for hospitals but are tenuous for 
small organisations like VWOs. The governance of VWOs appears to operate through 
different mechanisms. Dandelion, as we saw, operates on budget deficit and relies on 
multiple inconsistent sources of revenue—from state subsidies to donations. While 
state funding only accounts for 20% of its revenue, they are an invaluable resource 
when faced with tight budgets. Shallow pockets compel VWOs to approach the state, 
which demands nominal adherence to state guidelines and thereby reinforces the 
state’s biopolitical action. Audits, grants and subsidies are apparatuses through which 
the state governs care practices and ensures service improvement while keeping costs 
low. The biopolitics of healthcare (“who cares?”) is thus related to a biopolitics of its 
financing (“who pays?” or “who secures funds/resources?”). I further develop this 
argument by examining family-service provider relations in the next two sections. 
 
Families’ Expectations and Responsibilities of the Hired Hand  
Dementia care work occupies part of the healthcare sector, where care is outsourced 
from more intimate settings of the family to paid hands. At our first meeting, Benedict 
echoed the state’s view that families are primarily responsible for clients, and likens 
Dandelion to an institutional support for families. Its role, he explains, is to “provide 
respite for family members” whose spouses or parents are “down with dementia but 
cared for at home”. Yet, if state funding accounts for 20% of Dandelion’s revenue, the 
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amount that families pay as “programme fees” amounts to 10%—donations and fund-
raising amount to 70%43. Although insubstantial economically, “OPWDs’ families” as 
a population that requires support in caring for sick family members generate demand 
for dementia care services. Care work as embodied and ethical labour is thus situated 
alongside an economic relationship between Dandelion as service provider and family 
members as custodians of OPWDs and clients of their services. 
The Family-Service Provider Relationship 
Clients are admitted and discharged, and care workerss hired and leave, periodically; 
relationships exist along professional (care worker-client) terms. Care workers are 
mindful of role differences vis-à-vis families, and maintain “professional distance” 
(Corrine) when providing care. Corrine, upon Benedict’s direction, once sent a client 
to a clinic during work hours when the client was unwell. She reflected, “we must 
have compassion, but there are things that we can and cannot do, responsibilities that 
we cannot take up… Maybe we should have asked her family to come.” Care work is 
paid work performed during care workers’ shifts and in Dandelion’s compound, albeit 
occasional exceptions. Michelle once said, “we can only do so much for [clients], in 
the few hours they are here. We just do what we can do. Much depends on families or 
helpers who stay with clients”. Agnes also mentioned, “clients are clients, and we 
cannot treat them as family. [Helpers] can call them ‘auntie’, ‘uncle’ or ‘mummy’, but 
we shouldn’t. Families can get unhappy”. Thus, care workers observe 
circumscriptions in providing care. Boundaries matter, in defining the responsibilities 
and duties of care workers versus families, and the decisions that each can make.  
Preference for the term “clients” over “patients”, which, argues Benedict, 
reduces OPWDs to their sick role, also reveals that Dandelion prefers to see itself as a 
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service provider. This suggests that relationships are couched in professional, eliding 
towards commercial, terms even as care workers possess personal/intimate knowledge 
of clients’ biographies and habits. Dandelion decides whether clients are admitted, but 
they consult family members on how clients should be cared for upon admission. 
Observations at Dandelion and conversations with family members reveal that many 
of them expect DDCs to manage OPWDs’ BPSDs. Distress over BPSDs was a main 
reason for families to approach Dandelion and other care services. A family member 
described how his mother “caused [the family] headache when she wakes up in the 
middle of the night, open and close the door, and insist on going out”, “turn on the 
stove and forget to turn off”, and “[complain] to neighbours about us”. He continues, 
“We were in a mad rush to find a place that can provide expert care to cope with her 
needs”. Several visits to Dandelion with his mother led him to believe Dandelion to 
be “nearly ideal”, as it provides his mother with “a safe environment that she can 
engage in activities, and keep her mind ‘off things’”—which he elaborates as “being 
suspicious of everyone, including us (her family)”. Dandelion is envisioned to be the 
professional and commercial solution to caregiving problems at home (Annerstedl et 
al. 2000; Yap et al. 2005), and these expectations are weaved into how care work is 
performed. Hence, while the state “outsources” caregiving to families, VWOs and the 
community, it creates conditions for the development of alternative arrangements 
(Mehta 2004; Teo et. al. 2006). State support for VWO service providers avail options 
for PWDs’ families, such that they can “outsource” care to VWO service providers, as 
well as service providers, who could sustain operations and improve services through 
this commercial arrangement. 
Many other family members with whom I spoke have similar complaints of 
OPWDs’ behavioural difficulties, which cause families distress. Family caregivers are 
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often employed in full-time jobs or have other dependents (e.g. children) to look after, 
and had decided to send their spouses or parents to Dandelion after exhausting other 
options (e.g. leaving their jobs, or hiring a helper). Another caregiver shared that it 
was “too tiring to care for (her husband) full-time. I’m also not young anymore” and 
that she was able to rest and meet her retired siblings during her husbands’ Tuesdays 
and Thursdays at Dandelion. Some family caregivers, perhaps due to frustration, had 
even expected some degree of disregard by care workers. For instance, Mr Chew’s 
wife tried to dissuade me from engaging him in craftwork, remarking that “he doesn’t 
know (referencing cognitive decline)”, and I should “just watch him from beside and 
let him watch TV”. I learned from her subsequently that she faced great difficulty in 
caring for him due to their poor financial status (they were hawkers, but he stopped 
after Parkinson’s disease got worse and she, after about a year, to care for him); their 
childless marriage (she is his sole caregiver); and his “frequent bad moods”. She 
complained to care workers about her frustrations, many of whom simply smiled and 
acknowledged her difficulties; Penny said sympathetically, “It must have been quite a 
burden to shoulder by herself… Good that they managed to come here, so she can rest 
while he’s here and we take over (looking after him)”.  
It is instructive to compare her perspective with those of care workers’. Care 
workers persuade Mr Chew frequently despite his frequent refusal to participate in 
activities. While he is seated apart from other clients and given his own equipment for 
hygiene reasons—as loss of muscle control from Parkinson’s disease causes him to 
salivate uncontrollably—he is still accompanied by a care worker or volunteers during 
activities. Agnes assists him with light exercises that work to strengthen his muscles 
during quieter hours in late afternoon. When asked if this arrangement places pressure 
on manpower, Penny smiled and remarked, “no choice, he’s also one of our clients, 
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and we have the duty (zhe ren, “duty” or “responsibility” in Mandarin) to look after 
him, equal responsibility to other clients”. Hence, market relations generate an ethical 
duty towards clients; the care worker-client relationship entails commitment towards 
caring for clients however non-altruistic its economic origins may be. This illustrates 
Held’s (2006:111) argument that some aspects of care work are not reducible to 
capitalist values, and rewarding care workers for their work does not equate to 
commoditising care. In her words, it matters less “whether (care work) is paid or not 
but the norms under which it is done… are market values or some others”. Yet, Mrs 
Chew, despite her harshness, often brings snacks for Mr Chew, “because he is very 
picky… He won’t eat food that he doesn’t like”. It is unlikely that care workers will 
do the same for Mr Chew; they offered him more biscuits for afternoon tea after 
realising that he did not eat much for lunch, but buying snacks for him is beyond their 
purview. While care work at Dandelion engenders an ethical commitment that is not 
reducible to commercial values (Held 2006), care is still circumscribed by 
professional norms. 
 
Families’ Demands for Institutional and Biomedical Care 
Families are important stakeholders in making decisions (Iris 1988; Hicks and 
Lam 1999; Mehta, Osman and Lee 1995), whose opinions on caring for OPWDs and 
healthcare services shape care provision at Dandelion. We saw that many families 
experience frustration and fatigue when caring for OWPDs, and negative experiences 
are part of their reason for approaching Dandelion. Many families expect Dandelion 
to provide what they cannot provide, e.g. specialised attention, activities, and basic 
biomedical care. Cassandra’s daughter narrated her experience of watching Cassandra 
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slowly losing her ability to perform daily tasks, “We can’t be looking after her all the 
time. [My husband] and I work, so we sent her here. They did a great job in making 
sure that mummy’s looked after, fed properly, and has things to fill up her day”. She 
reiterated her knowledge of activities that Cassandra participated at Dandelion—“she 
picked up Chinese songs—I don’t know how (laughs)—and participates in games, 
craft work, and goes for outings. Exercise is beneficial even when she’s always been 
slim.” She continues, “They know better what activities are good for dementia 
patients. It’s good to be in a centre, better than what is offered in [her home country] 
or being at home” (my emphasis). From these narratives, we see that Cassandra’s 
daughter believes in the benefits of institutional care, and expects regular activities to 
be part of dementia care: “I asked (care workers) to get her to join in activities, do 
puzzles and do what others do. To maintain her mental state, even when some pushing 
is needed.” She ensures that Dandelion “keeps (Cassandra) occupied” by giving care 
workers ideas of things her mother did when she was younger, such as knitting, 
reading and keeping a diary. Care workers act upon most of her suggestions; one of 
them sits with Cassandra every afternoon, narrate activities that she did, and waits as 
she writes them down in a diary that she carries.  
Dorothy said, “Most families, they expect us to have activities, to occupy 
[clients’] time here, because it’s better than them doing nothing at home. Many also 
want [clients], by the time they go home, to be so tired that they don’t give [their 
families] trouble”. Care workers respond to families’ expectations to some extent, by 
adopting activities and programmes that resonate with expectations for institutional 
and biomedical care. Some family members request for care workers to accompany 
OPWDs to the toilet at regular intervals and before they leave Dandelion, so that they 
do not wet or soil themselves accidentally. Much effort is given to remembering the 
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“toileting” requirements and schedules of clients, and taking turns to bring them to the 
toilet between activities and before they leave. Cecilia also shared that some families 
rely on medicine prescribed by doctors for managing BPSDs, which they request for 
her to administer at appropriate hours, e.g. in late afternoon “so clients will not walk 
around, open cupboard [disturb their families], you know, when they are home [in the 
evening]”. She says when administering a prick test to Beng-choo who has diabetes, 
“the family gave us instructions to watch her food and check her sugar level, which 
we do every afternoon and sometimes, morning when she arrives.” After reassuring 
Beng-choo who was having her blood drawn, Cecilia lowered her voice, “We try to 
stick to what the family wants, but sometimes we see that clients… you know, we are 
all humans and should have some enjoyment in life, so we break the rules a little by 
allowing her a small piece of cake or biscuits and keep a closer watch later”. As such, 
care workers do not indiscriminately abide by families’ expectations for institutional 
and biomedical care (cf. Hicks and Lam 1999; Iris 1988). Decisions are undertaken in 
the course of care work, during which they weigh between observing professional 
norms of privileging families’ (as customers and primary caregivers) expectations, 
and care provided through intimate knowledge of clients’ habits and preferences 
(“technologies of the self for the other”) and, in Cecilia’s words, a recognition of them 
as fellow “humans”. 
In some instances, cooperation from families is needed to facilitate caregiving, 
and care is impeded when information or assistance is denied. Cecilia keeps records 
of clients’ medication, and sends letters to request families to update their medication 
record so as to ensure that the correct dose of the right medication is administered. 
Some families take weeks to reply, and delay means that clients sometimes take 
inappropriate (usually lower) doses for some time. Dandelion also tried to request for 
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clients’ old photos for biographical scrape books to be used for “reminiscence 
therapy”, as part of their PCC project, and requests were met with little success. 
Families are however more responsive to fieldtrips or outings. Approval is required 
from families (as clients’ legal custodians), but most families readily agree. Therefore, 
besides state regulations, audits and funding guidelines, care work is also subject to 
families’ demands, consensus and collaboration.  
Care workers, as service providers, are compelled to acknowledge and respond 
to, if not comply with, their suggestions of how clients should be cared for. Moreover, 
families are ideological empowered by the MHH approach as primary caregivers. The 
kinds of care demanded by clients’ families (e.g. institutional and biomedical care), 
and often duly carried out by care workers, might sometimes contradict Dandelion’s 
(and state-espoused) ideal of PCC (also Iris 1988). These examples illustrate that the 
ethical possibilities and limits of “care” provided by care workers are shaped by 
structural factors and decisions of others that sometimes beyond Dandelion’s control. 
VWOs do not operate as autonomous agents, and the “care” that they provide are not 
wholly the product of idiosyncratic decisions by care workers; rather, activities and 
“care” are both shaped by state, market and other external forces. 
 
Providing “care” within the Grids of Biopolitics 
Foucault (2003:81) writes, “the discipline of the body and regulation of the population 
[constitute] the two poles around which the organization of power was deployed”. 
Chapters 3 and 4 describe one end of these two poles, where “technologies of the self 
for the other”—for clients as “precarious minds”—develop against the backdrop of 
the MHH approach. This chapter approaches the issue of dementia care work from the 
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other end of this spectrum, by evaluating the implications of the MHH biopolitical 
regime on care decisions and practices. We saw that the Singapore state galvanises 
various segments of its citizenry in an organised attempt to tackle population ageing 
through a MHH approach. I showed how state ideals of financial prudence and service 
improvement shape care work at Dandelion. The state defines VWOs as autonomous, 
financially and otherwise, and the responsibilities of managing resources are turned 
upon Dandelion. Inadequate finances compel VWOs to rely on the state for support 
and subsidies, which in turn subject them to state guidelines and objectives. As 
service providers, VWOs and care workers are also subject to families’ demands and 
expectations, including demands for institutional and biomedical care. 
The MHH approach comprises an intricate system of state, family and VWOs, 
each of which shape and are shaped by decisions and actions of others, but to unequal 
extents due to power differences. This exemplifies the biopolitical governance of a 
population, through an assemblage of policies, rhetoric and other instruments, towards 
particular objectives—in this case, care provision for the aged sick (and OPWDs in 
particular). Despite Foucault’s (1980) emphasis on discourse (power-knowledge), I 
showed that funding schemes and economic relations work concomitantly with state 
discourses in shaping care practices. The state’s financial capacity and the family-
service provider relationship accords the state and families power and gives weight to 
their opinions on care work. Thus it is through both economic and discursive elements 
that biopower permeates institutions that make up the MHH framework. 
How then do care workers at Dandelion manoeuvre within a terrain marked by 
contradictory discourses, where state agencies espouse PCC and many families view 
institutional and biomedical care as fundamentals of day-care service provision? Care 
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workers adopt PCC and institutional/biomedical perspectives at different times, and 
focus on realising expectations of either family members or the state at each instance, 
rather than recognise the contradictions therein. A “practical attitude” (Schutz 1974) 
is adopted when experiencing, comprehending and manoeuvring through everyday 
issues, rather than attempts to reflexively understand structural conditions that shape 
their experience. In Benedict’s words, they are concerned with “mak[ing] things work 
and find[ing] solutions to the problems that come up” at each moment, rather than 
reflecting on whether actions cohere or impinge upon other ideals. He acknowledged 
during another conversation that there are “ethical dilemma in caring, but we still 
must [proceed] even if it’s difficult”. Care workers also intermittently reflect on their 
actions vis-à-vis ideals of the hegemonic PCC discourse. Failure to adhere to ideals is 
experienced as emotional distress, e.g. uncomfortable glances, blushing and chuckles. 
They are also reminded of PCC on occasions such as roll calls, when inability to 
perform PCC is communicated as individual failing—conveyed through an optimistic 
“let’s try harder”—rather than a cognizance of structural contradictions.  
I also showed that the state tries to incur lesser costs of providing care for the 
aged sick by out-sourcing care to families, VWOs and the community—families pay 
for care services (“programme fees” represent 10% of Dandelion’s revenue in 2013, 
and 42.1% of the healthcare sector’s revenue in 2014), and the community is another 
substantial contributor (donations and fundraising comprising 70% of Dandelions’ 
revenue in 2013, and 26.6% of the sector’s revenue in 2014. The responsibilities for 
gathering funds and resources (and risks of deficit) are delegated to VWOs, which 
both offsets economic pressures placed upon the state and (through positioning state 
agencies as avenues where funds can be obtained) allows the state the additional 
prerogative to govern practices and activities at VWOs. The VWO-service provider 
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relationship is also sustained through positioning families as primary caregivers, and 
VWOs as commercial alternatives that can provide families with respite in exchange 
for payment. The MHH framework, in which VWOs occupy an important position, 
thus allows the state to achieve both aims of ensuring adequate healthcare provision 
for its aged sick (biopolitics of healthcare) and keeping its healthcare budget lean 
(biopolitics of healthcare financing). 
Dementia care work involves acquiescence to, if not an effortful negotiation 
with, various ethical expectations, which becomes more complicated when families’ 
demands (e.g. institutional care) do not always cohere with state visions of “good 
care”—i.e. PCC. Care workers’ failure to “care” through PCC and “ethical dilemma” 
(Benedict) that care workers experience can be understood as a function of structural 
contradictions, rather than being solely conceived as individuals’ moral failing. Also, 
observations that Dandelion’s decisions and actions are oriented towards the state and 
families rather than care recipients reinforce Chapter 4’s argument that PWDs are 
excluded from a “politics of life” (Fassin 2009; Rose 2001). In tracing micropolitical 
practices of dementia care work to biopolitical processes, we realise that OPWDs are 
neither participants nor social actors in this arrangement that has implications on how 
they are cared for. While older persons with other illnesses (e.g. hypertension and 
diabetes) are stakeholders in the MHH framework (Mehta 2004; Wong et al. 1999), 
OPWDs, understood as “precarious minds”, are largely excluded from the MHH 
biopolitical regime and regarded as passive care recipients. 
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Chapter 6. Conclusion 
Dementia and other aged-related illnesses have increased in developed countries such 
as Singapore, and “care” has correspondingly expanded from the personal spaces of 
individuals and families to become a governmental concern and work/labour provided 
by healthcare services. This thesis has dementia care work as its central concern, and 
offers an understanding of how care workers “care” for OPWDs, whose behaviours 
are seen as problematic, and cognition as questionable and in decline. Extant research 
largely approach care work, dementia and otherwise, from the angle of power/politics, 
to the neglect of morality/ethics (e.g. Gubrium 1997; Kontos and Martin 2013; Lee-
Treweek 1998; McLean 1995; Moore 1999) or conceive “care” as a transcendent 
virtue easily extricable from economic concerns and power relations (e.g. Held 2004; 
Noddings 2003). This research continues efforts to bridge these perspectives and 
understand the relations between morality/ethics and politics (Fassin 2012, Lambek 
2010) and care, governance and power relations (Biehl 2012; Hochschild 1983; 
Sevenhuijsen 2015; Tronto 1993).  
Through the analytical lens of “biopower” (Foucault 1980, 1985, 1986, 1988), 
I demonstrated that dementia care is neither solely altruistic commitment nor power 
relations, but comprises an inconsistent interweaving of biopolitical action, intimate 
social relations, and ethical responsibility towards OPWDs (viz. “precarious minds)”. 
Foucault (1988) discussed the complexities of politics and ethics in his formulation of 
“technologies of the self”, contra an earlier overemphasis on “technologies of power”. 
In accounting for practices of knowing and cultivating oneself as an ethical subject, he 
acknowledged an aspect of power that is “productive” for individuals, which exists 
alongside power that “determine the conduct of individuals and submit them to certain 
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ends or domination” (Foucault 1988:18). In Foucault’s (1985, 1986, 1988) theory of 
biopower, “technologies of the self” intersect with “anatomopolitics” (Foucault 1980), 
in that individuals are embodied subjects and objects of biopolitical action, and agents 
and targets of power. Yet, due to his concern with ethical self-governance, he offers 
little theorising on care relations. Through observations of dementia care work at 
Dandelion, I argued that care practices can be theorised as “technologies of the self 
for the other”, by which care workers develop an embodied engagement (and 
“engrossment” (Noddings 2003)) of their comportment, movement and emotions, and 
an attention to those of clients. Bodily dispositions and actions are “cultivated” not for 
an ethical refinement of the self (cf. “care of the self” (Foucault 1986)) but for 
care/management of the other.  
While Foucault (1988) was concerned with theorising the relationship between 
“technologies of the self” as the locus of agency and autonomy, and “technologies of 
power” as an objectivising force in the governance of individuals towards biopolitical 
ends, I argue that this distinction is not directly applicable in care relations. Firstly, 
“technologies of the self for the other” involves care workers’ effortful cultivation of 
embodied practices (Mauss 1972), which translates to body work/labour (Cohen 
2011; Kang 2010; Wolkowitz 2002). Yet, efforts to know clients overlap with 
governance of clients’ behaviour, and indicates inequalities between empowered care 
workers and less empowered clients. Also, clients’ preferences and relationships are 
pitted against an institutional imperative to manage the client population, such that 
governance compromises attention paid to particular clients. Therefore, “technologies 
of the self for the other” shows how care and management intersect, and how multiple 
strands of moral/ethical action and power relations enfold upon each other.  
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“Care” for PWDs is further problematised when understandings of “precarious 
minds” produces a conundrum of whether clients are knowable, and how care workers 
can “care” for clients without regarding them as vulnerable and less capacitated. Ideas 
of “precarious minds” seemingly constitute PWDs in a “state of exception” (Agamben 
1998, 2005) as certain norms and expectations are not only suspended in interactions 
with PWDs, but these infringements become normalised in dementia care—as shown 
through examples on fabricated stories and overly generous care. Notions of 
“precarious minds” are increasingly challenged by PCC, which urges care workers to 
recognise clients’ actions as indications of personhood, and recognise clients’ choices, 
preferences and autonomy. Yet, care workers’ knowledge of clients’ vulnerabilities, 
developed in the course of care work, interpose some of PCC’s ideals, especially 
“autonomy”. Clients who are conceived as having severer dementia or fall risk are 
closely monitored, and PCC is more readily extended to clients who are deemed abler 
to care for themselves. Apart from notions of “precarious minds”, attempts to practise 
PCC are hindered by discrepant ideas about PWDs’ “personhood”. A reconsideration 
of how “dementia” can be incorporated into “personhood” is required in order to 
challenge the status quo, of PWDs in a “state of exception” (Agamben 1998, 2005).  
I also demonstrated how institutions such as state agencies and families shape 
the possibilities and limits of “care”. In showing how “technologies of the self for 
others (viz. precarious minds)” are shaped by the MHH biopolitical regime, this thesis 
also conceives of “care” in the form of healthcare governance. The proliferation of 
VWOs and geriatric services in recent decades, and the social space that they occupy 
in the MHH approach, is consequent to the state’s attention to population ageing and 
its attempt to “care” for the ageing population. PCC practised at Dandelion attests to 
the subtle yet effective permeation of state discourses of “good care” through an 
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assemblage of state policies, funding schemes and regulations. While families are 
ideologically positioned as primary caregivers, DDCs and other VWOs are provided 
as commercial caregiving alternatives and/or institutionalised means of respite, which 
many families also regard as a setting where “good (institutional/biomedical) care” is 
practised. Hence, the governmental healthcare project operates through “outsourcing” 
care for OPWDs and the aged sick to VWOs but also regulates their activities, and to 
VWOs via families (another institution to which care is “outsourced”) through the 
family-service provider relationship. Examined otherwise, DDCs, as institutionalised 
means of respite, also facilitate the state’s ideology of having the aged and aged sick 
cared for by their families. My analysis of “biopower” (Foucault 1988) thus illustrates 
how power, interposed with moral/ethical persuasions—e.g. filial piety, charity and 
prudence—permeate various institutions that are organised for care of the aged sick. 
This explicates a “productive” dimension of power, mediated (and complicated) 
through ethical ideals, that is often neglected in analyses that are solely concerned 
with exploitative aspects of politics and governance (Fassin 2012; Lambek 2010).  
I conclude this thesis by proposing areas for further research, especially with 
regards to dementia care in Singapore. This study examined dementia care from the 
perspective of a DDC, through which I conceptualised “technologies of the self (care 
workers) for the other (clients)” as situated within the MHH biopolitical regime. This 
focus enabled analyses of how “precarious minds” are related to and cared for at one 
particular institution. Inquiry can be extended through attempts to understand how 
ideas and practices that perpetuate or challenge “precarious minds” proceed at other 
loci in the biopolitical regime. In particular, the Singaporean family is an interesting 
social institution for the study of dementia care, not only because it is situated in the 
MHH framework through an ideology of “filial piety”, but also because recent 
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biomedical and genetics research postulate Alzheimer’s and Parkinson’s as genetic 
diseases that are hereditary. How might persons whose parents or grandparents are 
PWDs reconcile with these findings and how might this knowledge interact with state 
and cultural discourses (e.g. “filial piety”) in effecting dementia care practices? This 
can potentially contribute to theorising on “technologies of the self for the other” in 
the familial context, as shaped by state ideology, cultural beliefs (e.g. filial piety) and 
biomedical knowledge.  
A second line of inquiry can proceed from my recognition that processes and 
mechanisms of “biopower” (Foucault 1980, 1985, 1986) assume a devolving network-
like character rather than operate at discrete macro- and micro-political levels. Future 
research can deliberate on the continuities and discontinuities, and convergences and 
contestations between medical, state and quotidian discourses of “precarious minds” 
through examining various loci, from state agencies and population aging committees 
to hospitals, nursing homes, and step-down care facilities, and more intimate settings 
of the home/family. Apart from biomedical discourses, moral/ethical discourses, such 
as “active ageing” (World Health Organisation 2002), have also permeated quotidian 
notions of “good (later) life”, which may implicate how old-age chronic illnesses, e.g. 
dementia, are perceived. In light of these discourses, might the constitution of PWDs 
as “state of exception” (Agamben 1998, 2005) be evermore inexorable? The posing of 
these questions seems all the more urgent and necessary given demographic changes 
in developed societies, a burgeoning number of sufferers of other age-related diseases 
such as dementia, and emerging institutions and discourses on “life” in old age. 
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Endnotes 
1 I use “OPWDs” to refer to “older persons with dementia”, and “PWDs” to refer to 
“persons with dementia”. I follow Dandelion in using “clients” when referring to care 
recipients, except when I generalise my discussion to discuss “OPWDs/PWDs”, or to 
the aged sick in Singapore.  
2 The International Psychogeriatic Association (2002) defines BPSD as “symptoms of 
disturbed perception, thought content, mood or behaviour that frequently occur in 
[PWDs]”, including “anxiety, depressive moods, hallucinations, misidentifications, 
delusions, apathy, disinhibition, agitation, restlessness, wandering and physically 
aggressive behaviours (quoted in Ng 2013:19; also Kua 2012:47).  
3 “Healthcare services” refers to social services for the care provision of persons who 
are ill. This can be differentiated from biomedical institutions—e.g. hospitals—and 
social services that encompass many non-healthcare, e.g. family, youth and children; 
children-at-risk; senior activity centres; etc. although boundaries are blurred at times. 
4 The World Health Organisation (1994:47) defines “dementia” as “a syndrome due to 
the disease of the brain, of chronic or progressive nature, in which there is disturbance 
of multiple higher cortical functions: memory, thinking, orientation, comprehension, 
calculation, learning capacity, language and judgment.” It also explains, “Impairment 
of cognitive functions are commonly accompanied, and occasionally preceded, by 
deterioration in emotional control, social behaviour, or motivation”. 
5 Ministry of Health (2013) reports Alzheimer’s disease as the most prevalent form of 
dementia in Singapore, followed by vascular dementia (also Ng 2013). The MOH 
report suggests that the “age-adjusted prevalence” in Singapore to be 2.38% to 5.2%, 
but surmises these figures to be underestimates of “true prevalence” due to limitations 
in diagnoses of dementia, among other reasons (Ministry of Health 2013:14). 
6 Modes of governance, or “governmentality” (Foucault 1988), refer to “organized 
practices through which we are governed and through which we govern ourselves” 
(Dean 1999:18). Foucault (2007) argues that governmentality has shifted from the use 
of coercion and domination (i.e. sovereign power) to the calculated management of 
populations and techniques of self-regulation (i.e. biopower) in modernity.  
7 “(Bio)medicalisation”, Friedson (1970) and Bond (1992) argue, (re)defines non-
normative behaviours as biomedical issues, and mandates intervention by biomedical 
professionals who impose treatment on these medically ill. Biomedicine has been 
influential in recasting aging as a process of incremental decline (Estes and Binney 
1989) by emphasising physical and cognitive degeneration, in relation to other 
positive aspects of ageing (Zola, 1986).  
8 The Straits and Federated Malay States Government Medical School was started in 
1905 to train “native doctors” for the provision of biomedical care for “the native 
population and the poorest inhabitants” (Wong and Tay, 2005). Yet, the handful of 
graduates in the early years of its establishment was inadequate for the population.  
  108
9 I consider asylums due to the present role of IMH in formulating and regulating 
dementia care practices (e.g. guidelines and training, which I later discuss) and the 
institutionalisation of some PWDs at IMH dementia wards—although this did not 
happen until 1993, under the name of “acute geriatrician psychiatry inpatient ward”. 
There is thus some continuity between past and present dementia care practices. 
10 Religious institutions also participated in providing medical and welfare services 
(Reid and Thay, 2006). Churches operated by Christian missionaries are one example. 
Saint Andrew’s Medical Mission first opened its dispensary in 1913. More 
dispensaries and an 8-bed inpatient facility were added in the next two years, nursing 
training started in 1916, and the Mission opened an eye clinic, an antenatal clinic, a 
sexually transmitted diseases clinic, and an orthopaedic hospital in the 1920s and 
1930s.  
11 This historical presence of philanthropic and community efforts was later used by 
the 1980s post-colonial government in its own governance/biopolitical project to 
mobilise grass-root involvement and justify reduced state commitment towards the 
aged sick. 
12 Public health was tackled alongside the supplying of public housing with the 
formation of the Housing Development Board in 1961, and water management issues 
with the formation of the Public Utilities Board, both of which oversaw numerous 
urban renewal and infrastructural development plans in the 1960s and 1970s (Ministry 
of Health 2015). 
13 The 1950s and 1960s was purportedly “a time of great medical advances globally” 
(Lee and Satku 2016:2), during which new antibiotics, vaccines, drugs for 
hypertension and cancer, and technologies such as Computerised Tomography scan 
were invented. Rapid improvement in public health and management of acute diseases 
in the late 1960s and 1970s can also be traced to these modern medicine and 
technologies (Lee and Satku 2016; Thomas et al. 2016).  
14 The concerns as spelt out in the Report of the Committee on the Problems of the 
Aged (1984) are largely economic and governmental, rather than pertain to the issue 
of health and disease. The Report (1984:1) opened with “A Committee on the 
Problems of the Aged was appointed in June 1982 to study the problems that would 
be faced by society and the aged themselves, as the proportion of persons aged 65 and 
above in Singapore increases while the proportion of persons in the economically 
active age group declines… A larger proportion of aged persons with a smaller 
proportion of the economically active group would mean that there would be fewer 
economically active people to support the more inactive ones.” Due to its 
governmental and economic rather than medical focus, no specific diseases were 
stated but it can be suggested that dementia—as understood in 1984, which differs 
slightly from the present understanding due to medical advances since then (see Siow 
1985)—is subsumed under its broad concern for “the maintenance of physical and 
mental well-being throughout adult life”.  
15 The Committee on the Problems of the Aged (1984:4), for instance, also reported 
that “Community organisations and voluntary bodies should undertake the provision 
of a wide range of welfare, medical and social services to make it possible for families 
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to accommodate and care for the weaker and less ambulant aged persons in their own 
homes. The well-being of an aged person can be best maintained by the love and care 
shown to him [sic.] by his family members.” It is evident that since the inception of 
governmental efforts to care for the aged and aged sick in the 1980s, the state has 
positioned the family as primary caregiver.  
16 Dementia, recognised as non-life threatening that demands prolonged medical 
attention— and hence, high costs—is one of such diseases (see The Straits Times, 17 
March 1991; 22 December 1991; 24 August 1992; 17 November 1993; 15 March 
1994; 13 November 1994; 4 July 1995; 13 July 1995; 28 September 1995; etc.) 
17 Plans and experimentations with integrated care began in the mid-1990s, with 
initiatives by Alexandra Hospital—which started a “new network for the elderly sick” 
that “tied up with 30 rehabilitation centres, day-care and other health-care agencies to 
track the progress of elderly patients after they leave hospital”—in 1995 (The Straits 
Times, 27 September 1995) and the Committee on the Aged in 1996 (The Straits 
Times, 9 July 1996) among others. The present focus on step-down care led to 
increased training for healthcare workers at VWOs and other organisations (Ministry 
of Health 2015). The professionalization of care workers commences through training 
in biomedical knowledge and practices on one hand, and the promulgation of person-
centred care (PCC) on the other. 
18 Philip Yap, director of Singapore’s Khoo Teck Phuat Hospital geriatric centre, 
shared that PCC has only “caught on in Singapore in the last five to eight years [2007 
to 2010]” (The Straits Times, 12 April 2016).  
19 See these articles for recent discussions on PCC for OPWDs in Singapore: “Good 
medicine ‘treats and person, not just the illness” (The Straits Times, 11 March 2015), 
“Rethink how we care for the aged” (The Straits Times, 12 January 2016), “Person-
centric care must be sustainable” (The Straits Times, 15 January 2016), and “Help 
dementia patients live—and die—with dignity” (The Straits Times, 5 July 2016). 
20 This conundrum is also revealed in several articles, notably “Help dementia patients 
live—and die—with dignity” (The Straits Times, 5 July 2016)”, which seems to both 
frame dementia as causing “sufferers to lose their identity and autonomy”—which has 
indeed been critiqued by many PCC advocates—and urging caregivers, care workers 
and the public to “[help] patients live and die with dignity” without explicit attention 
to contradictions thereof.  
21 My understanding of Foucault’s (1980, 1985, 1986) theorising of “biopower”, 
especially when read against his reconceptualisation of power and politics (Foucault 
1988), suggests that processes and mechanisms of biopower assume a network 
character that permeates through a range of social institutions rather than operate at 
discrete levels of macro- and micro-politics. 
22 Its longer history compared to most other DDCs allows for insights on how 
dementia care work changed from Dandelion’s establishment in 2002 to present. Two 
care workers who had worked at Dandelion since 2002 were also able to inform me 
on changing care practices. This allowed me investigation on how PCC shaped care 
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work. Many clients reside in Bukit Merah (18.3%) and Queenstown (17.8%), which 
are among the most elderly-populated estates (Teo et al. 2006:32). 
23 I realised by April 2015 that this was unsurprising since busy schedules had led 
many families to use the DDC service in the first place. Family members visit 
Dandelion from time to time, to pick clients up, to speak to care workers, for festive 
celebrations, and for caregiver sessions and other events organized by Dandelion. 
These occasions are too fleeting for interviews to be conducted but, as I will show, 
they provide opportunities for conversations. Through these conversations, I also 
realised that many seemed more willing to share their views on care work at 
Dandelion than speak about their own experiences of caregiving.  
24 While opportunities were present at several occasions, I excused myself from 
observing instances where clients’ privacy is compromised (cf. Higgins 1998; Tinney 
2008). While Tinney (2008:220) argues that such care provision “increas[es] the 
power differential between [herself] and the residents [and increase] their dependency 
on [her]”, my decision was made in light of clients’ privacy and possible feelings of 
discomfort—Higgins (1998) describes one such incident of her witnessing the nudity 
of an informant, who became deeply embarrassed, which hampered further interaction 
between them. 
25 Harnett (2014:401), for instance, notes the difference between casual “small talk” 
and “job talk”, e.g. responding to instructions, reporting information, and listening to 
care plans. Apart from “job talk”, I observed that interviews—conducted between the 
informant and researcher and dislocated from the contexts of care work—approximate 
formal occasions. Informants are often uneasy at the start of an interview and appear 
hesitant to provide certain information. Moreover, I do not assume commensurability 
between conversations in formal occasions and “small talk”; both must be examined 
for possible discrepancies that may be further analysed.  
26 Refer to Appendix 1 for “interview schedule for care workers”. 
27 These chasms indicate the moral/ethical pressures that care workers experience, 
such that responses are framed vis-à-vis an official position of PCC espoused by IMH 
and Dandelion. I argue later that their reiterations of official stances demonstrate the 
emotional labour that care work entails (Chapter 3), and the biopolitical efficacy of 
the state in governing care practices among VWOs (Chapter 5). 
28 This depicts the “second transport” that leaves Dandelion at 8.45am and returns at 
9.45am. The “first transport” leaves at 7.45am and returns at 8.15am, whose clients 
are engaged in activities (e.g. puzzles and games) at their tables until 10.30am. 
Different routes are taken on different days of the week, depending on clients 
scheduled for the day—most clients go to Dandelion on Mondays, Wednesdays and 
Fridays; or Tuesdays and Thursdays.  
29 Different dishes, e.g. braised chicken, stir-fried vegetables, bean curd and omelette, 
are served on different days. Noodles are served on Wednesdays instead of rice, “so 
as to give more variety to the clients” (Benedict). Care workers sometimes add boiled 
water to dishes; Dorothy explains that these clients either like their meals to be wetter, 
or the sauce helps with swallowing. 
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30 Volunteers conduct activities during the lunch hour break on some days. A retired 
Chinese teacher conducts a singing session on two days of the week, and some 
volunteers offered to apply nail varnish for female clients during the earlier months of 
my fieldwork.  
31 This “afternoon transport” follows from the morning arrangement—clients from the 
“first transport” are sent home from Dandelion at 2.45pm, and clients from the 
“second transport” are sent home at 4.30pm. There are a few clients whose family 
members arrive to fetch them just before 5pm, and are engaged in conversation or left 
alone to watch TV.  
32 Sevenhuijsen (2015) departs from many other theorists on “ethics of care” in 
attending to “the political”. Her work on legal perspectives viz. “family law” from a 
feminist perspective is inspired by Foucault’s theorising (1980, 1985) on “discourse”. 
She cites feminists Smart (1992, 1995), Tronto (1995) and Van den Burg (1993) 
among others, in developing her theorising of “care”. Her argument for a “caring 
justice” (Sevenhuijsen 2015:87), where “listening, responsiveness, attentiveness and 
commitment to see issues from different perspectives” are “essential in shaping public 
opinion on the issue of which needs should be met, and in which way” parallels my 
theorising of “technologies of the self for the other”. However, my theorising also 
attempts to situate the micropolitics of care relations vis-à-vis the structural context 
through a consideration of “biopolitics” (Foucault 1980).  
33 Dandelion uses both “severe” and “advanced” in its categorising of clients; these 
categories have become part of an everyday language for care workers, but it can be 
traced to commonly used biomedical and psychiatric manuals (e.g. Diagnostic and 
Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, 4th ed. (American Psychiatric Association 
1994) and state healthcare guidelines (e.g. Clinical Practice Guidelines on Dementia 
(Ministry of Health 2013)). At Dandelion, “Advanced” is also used in contrast to 
“active” (more able-bodied, with no fall risks) clients, as “these groups overlap most 
of the time” (Cecilia). Again, this shows that precise definitions of biomedical 
language and categories are overlooked in their everyday use (Sinha 1995).  
34 The Ministry of Health (2013:90) explains “sundowning” as “occurrence and 
exacerbation of BPSD in the afternoon or evening. Agitation and sleep disturbances 
commonly accompany sundowning”. It adds, “sundowning increases the burden of 
care on caregivers, as it often occurs when staffing in institutional settings is at the 
lowest levels. The circadian, hormonal, physiological, and environmental factors are 
associated with sundowning”. 
35 The emphasis on personhood can be traced to hospices and nursing homes in the 
1960s that were “situated at crossroads of curing and caring” (Barrett 2011:485), 
when care provision became the treatment for chronic illnesses for which biomedicine 
has no solution. Hospice care is structured around values of empathy and family-
oriented and community-provided care, departing from hospitals’ concern for 
diagnosis, curative treatment, and pharmaceutical intervention (Hallenbeck 2003; 
Stoddard 1991).  
36 Agnes shared that “When planning, we think of how to engage [clients] based on 
their interests and passion, what they used to do when they were younger, their 
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occupation, whether they are housewives or engineers.” Hence, although care workers 
make reference to clients as “precarious minds” in dementia care, OPWDs are not 
seen as a “unified category that overlooks important aspects of diversity and social 
difference” (cf. Kontos and Martin 2013; also Kayser-Jones 1995; Savishinsky 1991). 
37 Power in medieval Europe, argues Foucault (1977, 2008), operates through 
domination, coercion and violence, and offenders against sovereign authority—of 
which treason was the greatest offence—were tortured and put to death. Sovereign 
power has authority to dictate death and spare lives, or as Foucault (1980) writes, “let 
live and make die”.   
38 Quoted from a book chapter by Lai Wei Lin, Deputy Secretary, Ministry of Health, 
entitled “Paying for Healthcare” in Singapore’s Health Care System: What 50 Years 
Have Achieved. 
39 The government actively encourages financial support of the aged by their adult 
children, notably through these policies: Children are granted an income tax relief of 
$3,500 per annum for the maintenance of each parent, and $4,500 in the case of co-
residence; these income tax reliefs are provided as long as the parents earn no more 
than $2,000 per year. Adult children who intend to live with elderly parents are given 
top priority when applying for government housing, and first-time buyers who stay 
near their parents’ homes are granted a $50,000 housing grant as compared to the 
$40,000 that other first-time buyers receive (Chan 2008).  
40 Clients discharged due to medical conditions are re-assessed before they are re-
admitted, and “some who deteriorated over the course of a few months [during 
hospitalization]… are sometimes not accepted back. Or they have to look elsewhere if 
there is no space for us to take them in” (Corrine). Furthermore, most clients are 
usually arranged to be at Dandelion two or three days weekly due to manpower 
constraints. 
41 For instance, hand bars are placed along a corridor that leads to the toilet, and signs 
placed to direct clients. Tables are rearranged to provide comfort for clients and 
accessibility to care workers. Benedict told me that the auditing panel was “very 
satisfied” with Dandelion, and had only advised them to improve the emergency 
button in the toilet; this feature enhances clients’ independence to use the toilet while 
also mitigating safety risks.   
42 Care workers and I attended PCC and other courses from January to March 2015, 
and the audit by MOH was conducted at about the same time. I observed that both 
worked together to reinforce the ideological hegemony of PCC at Dandelion: 
guidelines proposed by MOH, Benedict urging care workers to follow guidelines, care 
workers reflecting on knowledge acquired at IMH’s courses, and MOH’s guidelines 
reinforcing these through the audit.  
43 I note that from figures provided by the Commissioner of Charities (2015), $614.1 
million or 42.1% of healthcare sector’s revenue is derived from “programs and 
services”, which means that most other VWO service providers’ “programme fees” 
account for much more than 10% of their revenue.   
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Appendix 1. Interview Schedule for Care Workers 
General Questions  
1. Could you share some your experiences of caregiving? What values or virtues do 
you think is required of dementia caregiving?  
2. Is there anything unique or different about caring for persons with dementia? What 
are some things that you especially look out for? 
3. What are some difficulties that you face as a professional caregiver at the DDC? 
4. What are some of your encounters with family members?  
5. How do past experiences affect some of your present care decisions or actions? 
6. What do you understand by “person-centered care” (PCC)? How do you put PCC 
into practice, and what are some difficulties in doing so? 
 
Questions for DDC Manager and Staff Nurse (In addition to above) 
1. What is the process through which clients are admitted? How much do clients’ 
families pay, and in what circumstances are they subsidised?  
2. When and why are clients “discharged” from Dandelion?  
3. What are the staffing requirements at the DDC? How many permanent and locum 
staffs do we have now? What are some solutions that you have come up with to 
deal with manpower issues? What are their implications? 
4. What are particular standards that you try to implement at the DDC, with respect to 
caregiving practices (e.g. PCC, importance of safety)? Why are these desirable or 
important? What are difficulties in implementing them? 
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Appendix 2. Care Workers at Dandelion Dementia Day-Care Centre 
Manager 
In his thirties, Benedict joined the healthcare services industry a decade ago, and had 
progressed from Dandelion’s social worker to become its DDC manager. He leads a 
team comprising a staff nurse, an occupational therapist, 5 to 6 healthcare assistants 
(HCAs), and locum (ad-hoc) staff. I refer to them collectively as “care workers”. 
Apart from his managerial role, Benedict liaises with the Agency of Integrated Health 
(AIC) on referral of clients, and state and non-state agencies for funding, manpower 
training, etc. He communicates with clients’ families and arranges for home visits to 
learn about clients’ medical conditions, their biographies, and families’ situations. He 
also works with charity organisations to raise funds and organise programmes for the 
clients; social workers to advise families on funding schemes; and shows visitors and 
volunteers around the DDC, so as to “educate them on dementia, to let them know 
that (OPWDs) are not as they imagined, violent or hard to handle”.  
 
Nurse and Medical Staff 
  A nurse, an occupational therapist (OT), and locum physiotherapists (PT) 
attend to clients’ medical needs. Cecilia was the nurse when I started fieldwork, and 
had been there for 3 years. Her duties include monitoring clients’ health conditions—
conducting mental health assessments, prick tests for diabetic clients, blood pressure 
tests, etc.—, administering medication, and tending to basic medical needs. She left to 
pursue further nursing education in August 2015, and Corrine, who used to intern at 
Dandelion, replaced her. Cecilia and Corrine also perform care work, as did HCAs, 
especially during manpower shortages. They also provide health-related advice such 
as meal preparation (e.g. dietary requirements for clients with swallowing difficulty or 
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diabetes), the need for wheelchairs or walking aid, and categorisation of clients into 
different stages of dementia. Nursing is a site where biomedical discourses permeate 
into care work, but nurses’ involvement in care work also meant awareness to clients’ 
embodied behaviour that guards against biomedicalisation of “care” (cf. Bond 1992).  
According to Benedict, the MOH regulates that dementia care facilities have 
to provide occupational therapy. Gladys, the occupational therapist (OT) comes twice 
a week to conduct activities such as cooking, craftwork, and trips to nearby eateries 
and supermarkets, which actualise the IMH and Dandelion’s espousal of PCC. These 
activities, she says, “help clients live with dementia” and delay its debilitating effects; 
they would “enable clients to be as independent and self-reliant as they can, to try to 
do what they used to do before, in earlier days before dementia”. Rather than refuting 
biomedical ideas of dementia, Gladys is engaged in a dual project of encouraging the 
clients to be more “independent and self-reliant” and getting others to recognise 
clients’ “personhood”. As instances of how PCC can be actualised, her projects also 
influence how care is perceived and performed.  
 
Healthcare Assistants 
Dementia care work involves much planning, preparation and physical labour, 
and these are in large part performed by healthcare assistants (HCAs). There were 5 
or 6 HCAs at Dandelion at any one time44, variously responsible for conducting daily 
activities, ensuring clients’ safety and well-being, meal preparations, accompanying 
clients to toilets, and “escorting” clients on the DDC’s transportation. These practices, 
inter alia, form the basis of what I consider “care work”. They are laborious and 
emotionally intensive, often dull and repetitive, but which also require an anticipation 
of unexpected incidents. HCAs keep their senses attuned to distress and illness, shouts 
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and complaints, and signs of danger. Postures and movements are adapted to those of 
clients, but HCAs also have to adapt quickly to unexpected occurrences. Additionally, 
Agnes described care work as  “quite structured, because most things are planned… 
but we still have to make changes now and then, because unexpected things happen”. 
Michelle elaborated that many decisions that concern clients’ safety, privacy and 
autonomy have to be taken in situ, some of which defy other ideals of caregiving. It 
could be seen that dementia care work not only takes shape within care discourses, 
but decision-making and negotiation between discourses are part of care work itself. 
Although recognised as “professional care workers”, HCAs receive a meagre monthly 
salary (below SGD$2000), and some are hired on a one-year contract basis. Monetary 
benefits that follow from the professionalization of medicine, nursing and social work 
does not seem to trickle down to the HCAs that occupy a lower rung of the healthcare 
and social services sector. I surmise that these disincentives account for the “high 
turnover rate of care workers” that Benedict saw as commonplace among HCAs.  
 
Locum Staff, and Others 
Dandelion overcomes much of its manpower shortages by hiring locum nurses 
and HCAs, who are non-contractual staffs who come only when required45. It also 
relies on interns who arrive in groups of two or three and stay for a few months, and 
who are trained to perform HCAs’ roles. Volunteers come on fixed days of the week 
to accompany clients or conduct activities, e.g. morning exercises. Some volunteer to 
conduct Chinese classes for mandarin-speaking clients during lunch, cook dessert, or 
maintain the fish tanks. Its reliance on locum staff, volunteers and interns, who may 
not always be available whenever needed, are also faced by other VWOs that provide 
healthcare and social services. 
